# Simple Demographics Often Identify People Uniquely 

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## 1. Abstract

In this document, I report on experiments I conducted using 1990 U.S. Census summary data to determine how many individuals within geographically situated populations had combinations of demographic values that occurred infrequently. It was found that combinations of few characteristics often combine in populations to uniquely or nearly uniquely identify some individuals. Clearly, data released containing such information about these individuals should not be considered anonymous. Yet, health and other person-specific data are publicly available in this form. Here are some surprising results using only three fields of information, even though typical data releases contain many more fields. It was found that $87 \%$ ( 216 million of 248 million) of the population in the United States had reported characteristics that likely made them unique based only on \{5-digit ZIP, gender, date of birth\}. About half of the U.S. population (132 million of 248 million or $53 \%$ ) are likely to be uniquely identified by only \{place, gender, date of birth\}, where place is basically the city, town, or municipality in which the person resides. And even at the county level, \{county, gender, date of birth\} are likely to uniquely identify $18 \%$ of the U.S. population. In general, few characteristics are needed to uniquely identify a person.

## 2. Introduction

Data holders often collect person-specific data and then release derivatives of collected data on a public or semi-public basis after removing all explicit identifiers, such as name, address and phone number. Evidence is provided in this document that this practice of de-identifying data and of ad hoc generalization are not sufficient to render data anonymous because combinations of attributes often combine uniquely to re-identify individuals.

### 2.1. Linking to re-identify de-identified data

In this subsection, I will demonstrate how linking can be used to re-identify de-identified data. The National Association of Health Data Organizations (NAHDO) reported that 44 states have legislative mandates to collect hospital level data and that 17 states have started collecting ambulatory care data from hospitals, physicians offices, clinics, and so forth [1]. These data collections often include the patient's ZIP code, birth date, gender, and ethnicity but no explicit identifiers like name or address. The leftmost circle in Figure 1 contains some of the data elements collected and shared.

For twenty dollars I purchased the voter registration list for Cambridge Massachusetts and received the information on two diskettes [2]. The rightmost circle in Figure 1 shows that these data included the name, address, ZIP code, birth date, and gender of each voter. This information can be linked using ZIP, birth date and gender to the medical information, thereby linking diagnosis, procedures, and medications to particularly named individuals. The question that remains of course is how unique would such linking be.

In general I can say that the greater the number and detail of attributes reported about an entity, the more likely that those attributes combine uniquely to identify the entity. For example, in the voter list, there were 2 possible values for gender and 5 possible five-digit ZIP codes; birth dates were within a range of 365 days for 100 years. This gives 365,000 unique values, but there were only 54,805 voters.
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Figure 1 Linking to re-identify data

### 2.2. Publicly and semi-publicly available health data

As mentioned in the previous subsection, most states (44 of 50 or $88 \%$ ) collect hospital discharge data [3]. Many of these states have subsequently distributed copies of these data to researchers, sold copies to industry and made versions publicly available. While there are many possible sources of patient-specific data, these represent a class of data collections that are often publicly and semi-publicly available.

```
# Field description Size
1 HOSPITAL ID NUMBER }1
2 PATIENT DATE OF BIRTH (MMDDYYYY) }
3 SEX 1
4 ADMIT DATE (MMDYYYY) }
5 DISCHARGE DATE (MMDDYYYY) }
6 ADMIT SOURCE 1
7 ADMIT TYPE }
8 LENGTH OF STAY (DAYS) 4
9 PATIENT STATUS 2
10 PRINCIPAL DIAGNOSIS CODE }
11 SECONDARY DIAGNOSIS CODE - }1
12 SECONDARY DIAGNOSIS CODE - 26
13 SECONDARY DIAGNOSIS CODE - 36
14 SECONDARY DIAGNOSIS CODE - 46
15 SECONDARY DIAGNOSIS CODE - 56
16 SECONDARY DIAGNOSIS CODE - 66
17 SECONDARY DIAGNOSIS CODE - 76
18 SECONDARY DIAGNOSIS CODE - 86
19 PRINCIPAL PROCEDURE CODE }
20 SECONDARY PROCEDURE CODE - 17
21 SECONDARY PROCEDURE CODE - }2
22 SECONDARY PROCEDURE CODE - 37
23 SECONDARY PROCEDURE CODE - 4 7
24 SECONDARY PROCEDURE CODE - 5 7
25 DRG CODE 3
```

\# Field description Size
26 MDC CODE 2
27 TOTAL CHARGES 9
28 ROOM AND BOARD CHARGES 9
29 ANCILLARY CHARGES 9
30 ANESTHESIOLOGY CHARGES 9
31 PHARMACY CHARGES 9
32 RADIOLOGY CHARGES 9
33 CLINICAL LAB CHARGES 9
34 LABOR-DELIVERY CHARGES 9
35 OPERATING ROOM CHARGES 9
36 ONCOLOGY CHARGES 9
37 OTHER CHARGES 9
38 NEWBORN INDICATOR 1
39 PAYER ID 19
40 TYPE CODE 11
41 PAYER ID 29
42 TYPE CODE 21
43 PAYER ID 39
44 TYPE CODE 31
45 PATIENT ZIP CODE 5
46 Patient Origin COUNTY 3
47 Patient Origin PLANNING AREA 3
48 Patient Origin HSA 2
49 PATIENT CONTROL NUMBER
50 HOSPITAL HSA 2

Figure 2 IHCCCC Research Health Data

The Illinois Health Care Cost Containment Council (IHCCCC) is the organization in the State of Illinois that collects and disseminates health care cost data on hospital visits in Illinois. IHCCCC reports more than $97 \%$ compliance by Illinois hospitals in providing the information
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[4]. Figure 2 contains a sample of the kinds of fields of information that are not only collected, but also disseminated.

Of the states mentioned in the NAHDO report, 22 of these states contribute to a national database called the State Inpatient Database (SID) sponsored by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ). A copy of each patient’s hospital visit in these states is sent to AHRQ for inclusion in SID. Some of the fields provided in SID are listed in Figure 3 along with the compliance of the 13 states that contributed to SID's 1997 data [5].

| Field | Comments | \#states | \%states |
| :--- | :--- | ---: | ---: |
| Patient Age | years | 13 | $100 \%$ |
| Patient Date of birth | month, year | 5 | $38 \%$ |
| Patient Gender |  | 13 | $100 \%$ |
| Patient Racial background |  | 11 | $85 \%$ |
| Patient ZIP | 5-digit | 9 | $69 \%$ |
| Patient ID | encrypted (or scrambled) | 3 | $23 \%$ |
| Admission date | month, year | 8 | $62 \%$ |
| Admission day of week |  | 12 | $92 \%$ |
| Admission source | emergency, court/law, etc | 13 | $100 \%$ |
| Birth weight | for newborns | 5 | $38 \%$ |
| Discharge date | month, year | 7 | $54 \%$ |
| Length of stay |  | 13 | $100 \%$ |
| Discharge status | routine, death, nursing home, etc | 13 | $100 \%$ |
| Diagnosis Codes | ICD9, from 10 to30 | 13 | $100 \%$ |
| Procedure Codes | from 6 to 21 | 13 | $100 \%$ |
| Hospital ID | AHA\# | 12 | $92 \%$ |
| Hospital county |  | 12 | $92 \%$ |
| Primary payer | Medicare, insurance, self-pay, etc | 13 | $100 \%$ |
| Charges | from 1 to 63 categories | 11 | $85 \%$ |

Figure 3 Some data elements for AHRQ's State Inpatient Database (13 participating states)

| State | Month and Year of Birth date | Age |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Arizona | Yes | Yes |
| California |  | Yes |
| Colorado | Yes | Yes |
| Florida | Yes |  |
| Iowa | Yes |  |
| Massachusetts |  | Yes |
| Maryland |  | Yes |
| New Jersey | Yes | Yes |
| New York | Yes | Yes |
| Oregon |  | Yes |
| South Carolina | Yes |  |
| Washington | Yes | Yes |
| Wisconsin |  | Yes |

Figure 4 Age information provided by states to SID

Figure 4 lists the states reported in Figure 3 that provide the month and year of birth and the age for each patient.
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The remainder of this document provides experimental results from summary data that show how demographics often combine to make individuals unique or almost unique in data like these.

### 2.3. A single attribute

The frequency with which a single characteristic occurs in a population can help identify individuals based on unusual or outlying information. Consider a frequency distribution of birth years found in the list of registered voters. It is not surprising to see fewer people present with earlier birth years. Clearly, a person born in 1900 is unusual and by implication less anonymous in data.

### 2.4. More than one attribute

What may be more surprising is that combinations of characteristics can combine to occur even less frequently than the characteristics appear alone.

| ZIP | Birth | Gender | Race |
| :--- | :--- | :---: | :--- |
| 60602 | $7 / 15 / 54$ | m | Caucasian |
| 60140 | $2 / 18 / 49$ | f | Black |
| 62052 | $3 / 12 / 50$ | f | Asian |

Figure 5 Data that looks anonymous

Consider Figure 5. If the three records shown were part of a large and diverse database of information about Illinois residents, then it may appear reasonable to assume that these three records would be anonymous. However, the 1990 federal census [6] reports that the ZIP (postal code) 60602 consisted primarily of a retirement community in the Near West Side of Chicago and therefore, there were very few people (less than 12) of an age under 65 living there. The ZIP code 60140 is the postal code for Hampshire, Illinois in Dekalb county and reportedly there were only two black women who resided in that town. Likewise, 62052 had only four Asian families. In each of these cases, the uniqueness of the combinations of characteristics found could help reidentify these individuals.

| Race | Birth | Gender | ZIP | Problem |
| :--- | :--- | :---: | :--- | :--- |
| Black | $09 / 20 / 65$ | m | 02141 | short of breath |
| Black | $02 / 14 / 65$ | m | 02141 | chest pain |
| Black | $10 / 23 / 65$ | f | 02138 | hypertension |
| Black | $08 / 24 / 65$ | f | 02138 | hypertension |
| Black | $11 / 07 / 64$ | f | 02138 | obesity |
| Black | $12 / 01 / 64$ | f | 02138 | chest pain |
| White | $10 / 23 / 64$ | m | 02138 | chest pain |
| White | $03 / 15 / 65$ | f | 02139 | hypertension |
| White | $08 / 13 / 64$ | m | 02139 | obesity |
| White | $05 / 05 / 64$ | m | 02139 | short of breath |
| White | $02 / 13 / 67$ | m | 02138 | chest pain |
| White | $03 / 21 / 67$ | m | 02138 | chest pain |

Figure 6 De-identified data
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As another example, Figure 6 contains de-identified data. Each row contains information about a distinct person, so information about 12 people is reported. The table contains the following fields of information \{Race/Ethnicity, Date of Birth, Gender, ZIP, Medical Problem\}.

In Figure 6, there is information about an equal number of African Americans (listed as Black) as there are Caucasian Americans (listed as White) and an equal number of men (listed as $m$ ) as there are women (listed as $f$ ), but in combination, there appears only one Caucasian female.

### 2.5. Learned from the examples

These examples demonstrate that in general, the frequency distributions of combinations of characteristics have to be examined in combination with respect to the entire population in order to determine unusual values and cannot be generally predicted from the distributions of the characteristics individually. Of course, obvious predictions can be made from extreme distributions --such as values that do not appear in the data will not appear in combination either.

## 3. Background of definitions and terms

Definition (informal). Person-specific data Collections of information whose granularity of details are specific to an individual are termed person-specific data. More generally, in entity-specific data, the granularity of details is specific to an entity.

## Example. Person-specific data

Figure 5 and Figure 6 provide examples of person-specific data. Each row of these tables contains information related to one person.

The idea of anonymous data is a simple one. The term "anonymous" means that the data cannot be linked or manipulated to confidently identify the individual who is the subject of the data.

Definition (informal). Anonymous data Anonymous data implies that the data cannot be manipulated or linked to confidently identify the entity that is the subject of the data.

Most people understand that there exist explicit identifiers, such as name and address, which can provide a direct means to communicate with the person. I term these explicit identifiers; see the informal definition below.

Definition (informal). Explicit identifier An explicit identifier is a set of data elements, such as \{name, address\} or \{name, phone number\}, for which there exists a direct communication method, such as email, telephone, postal mail, etc., where with no additional information, the designated person could be directly and uniquely contacted.

A common incorrect belief is that removing all explicit identifiers such as name, address and phone number from the data renders the result anonymous. I refer to this instead as $d e$ identified data; see the informal definition below.

Definition (informal). De-identified data De-identified data result when all explicit identifiers, such as name, address, or phone number are removed, generalized or replaced with a made-up alternative.

## Example. De-identified data

Figure 5 and Figure 6 provide examples of de-identified person-specific data. There are no explicit identifiers in these data.

Because a combination of characteristics can combine uniquely for an individual, it can provide a means of recognizing a person and therefore serve as an identifier. In the literature, such combinations were nominally introduced as quasi-identifiers [7] and identificates [3-58] with no supporting evidence provided as to how identifying specific combinations might be. Extending beyond the literature and its casual use in the literature, I term such a combination a quasi-identifier and informally define it below. I then examine specific quasi-identifiers found within publicly and semi-publicly available data and compute their general ability to uniquely associate with particular persons in the U.S. population.

Definition (informal). Quasi-identifier A quasi-identifier is a set of data elements in entity-specific data that in combination associates uniquely or almost uniquely to an entity and therefore can serve as a means of directly or indirectly recognizing the specific entity that is the subject of the data.

## Example. Quasi-identifier

A quasi-identifier whose values are unique for all the records in Figure 6 is $\{Z I P$, gender, Birth\}.

In the next section, I will show that $\{Z I P$, gender, Birth $\}$ is a unique quasi-identifier for most people in the U.S. population.

The term table is really quite simple and is synonymous with the casual use of the term data collection. It refers to data that are conceptually organized as a 2 -dimensional array of rows (or records) and columns (or fields). A database is considered to be a set of one or more tables.

Definition (informal). Table, tuple and attribute A table conceptually organizes data as a 2 -dimensional array of rows (or records) and columns (or fields). Each row (or record) is termed a tuple. A tuple contains a relationship among the set of values associated with an entity. Tuples within a table are not necessarily unique. Each column (also known as a field or data element) is called an attribute and denotes a field or semantic category of information that is a set of possible values; therefore, an attribute is also a domain. Attributes within a table are unique. So by observing a table, each row is an ordered $n$-tuple of values $\left.<d_{1}, d_{2}, \ldots, d_{n}\right\rangle$ such that each value $d_{j}$ is in the domain of the $j$-th column, for $j=1,2, \ldots, n$ where $n$ is the number of columns.

In mathematical set theory, a relation corresponds with this tabular presentation; the only difference is the absence of column names. Ullman provides a detailed discussion of relational database concepts [9].

## Examples of tables

Figure 5 provides an example of a person-specific table with attributes $\{Z I P$, Birth, Gender, Race \}. Each tuple concerns information about a single person. Figure 6 provides an example of a person-specific table with attributes \{Race, Birth, Gender, ZIP, Problem\}.

Unfortunately, the terminology with respect to data collections is not the same across communities and diverse communities have an interest in this work. In order to accommodate these different vocabularies, I provide the following thesaurus of interchangeable terms. In general, data collection, data set and table refer to the same representation of information though a data collection may have more than one table. The terms record, row and tuple all refer to same kind of information. Finally, the terms data element, field, column and attribute refer to the same kind of information. For brevity, from this point forward, I will use the more formal database terms of table, tuple and attribute. I do allow the tuples of a table to appear in a "sorted" order on occasion and such cases pose a slight deviation from its more formal meaning. These uses are explicitly noted.

## 4. Methods

### 4.1. Census Tables

Information from the 1990 US Census made available on the Web [10] and on CDROM [11] and from the U.S. Postal Service [12] was loaded into Microsoft Access and the following tables produced and used with Microsoft Excel.

1. ZIP census table provides 1990 federal census information summarized by each ZIP (postal code) in the United States.
2. Place census table provides 1990 federal census information summarized by place name (town, city, municipality, or postal facility name).
3. County census table provides 1990 federal census information summarized by US counties.

Figure 7 contains a list of attributes (or data elements) for each of these tables. The name and description of each attribute is listed and a "yes" appears in the column that associates the attribute to the ZIP, Place or County table in which the attribute appears. Information for all 50 states and the District of Columbia were provided. For example, values associated with the attribute Tot_pop in the ZIP table are the total numbers of individuals reported as living in each corresponding ZIP. Each tuple (or row) in the table corresponds to a unique ZIP.

Given a particular geographical specification such as ZIP, place or county, the number of people reported as residing in the noted geographical area is reported by age subdivision in the ZIP, Place and County tables. The age subdivisions are: under 12 years of age (denoted as Aunder12), between 12 and 18 years of age (denoted as A12to18), between 19 and 24 years of age (denoted as A19to24), between 25 and 34 years of age (denoted as A25to34), between 35 and 44 years of age (denoted as $A 35$ to44), between 45 and 54 years of age (denoted as A45to54),
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between 55 and 64 years of age (denoted as A55to64) or more than 65 years of age (denoted as A65Plus).

| Field | Description | ZIP | PLACE COUNTY |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :---: | :---: |
| StateID | State Code | yes | yes | yes |
| ZIP | 5-digit ZIP | yes | NO | NO |
| Place | Name of Incorporated Place | NO | yes | NO |
| CoName | County Name | NO | NO | yes |
| Tot_Pop | Total Population | yes | yes | yes |
| AUnder12 | Population Under Age 12 Years | yes | yes | yes |
| A12to18 | Population Age 12-18 Years | yes | yes | yes |
| A19to24 | Population Age 19-24 Years | yes | yes | yes |
| A25to34 | Population Age 25-34 Years | yes | yes | yes |
| A35to44 | Population Age 35-44 Years | yes | yes | yes |
| A45to54 | Population Age 45-54 Years | yes | yes | yes |
| A55to64 | Population Age 55-64 Years | yes | yes | yes |
| A65Plus | Population Age 65 Years and up | yes | yes | yes |

Figure 71990 Census attributes in ZIP, Place, County tables

### 4.2. ZIPNameGIS Table

ZIP information provided from the U.S. Postal Service included place, which is a name of a town, city, municipality or postal facility uniquely assigned to a ZIP code. This information was loaded directly to provide the ZIPNameGIS table. The attributes (or data elements) for the ZIPNameGIS table are \{StateID, ZIP, State, POName, longitude, latitude, population\}.

The Place table was constructed by linking the ZIP table to the ZIPNameGIS table on ZIP. Results were then grouped by POName (respecting state designations) so that population information from multiple ZIP codes were grouped together by the city or town in which the ZIP code referred. Finally, the Place table was generated by collapsing these groupings into single entries that contained the sum of the population values reported for all ZIP codes corresponding to the same place.

During the process, 3 ZIP codes were found to cross state lines and therefore, be listed in two states. To avoid this duplication, the following assignments were made: (1) ZIP code 32530 refers to Pinetta in both Florida and Georgia. The Georgia entry was removed from Place; (2) ZIP code 42223 refers to Fort Campbell in both Kentucky and Tennessee. The Tennessee entry was removed from Place; and, (3) ZIP code 63673 refers to Saint Mary in both Illinois and Missouri. The Missouri entry was removed from Place.

### 4.2.1. Schemas of shared data

Figure 2 and Figure 3 contain descriptions of publicly and semi-publicly available hospital discharge data. Below are some quasi-identifiers found in those data that also appear in the census data. The experiments reported in this document estimate the uniqueness of values associated with these quasi-identifiers given the occurrences reported in the census data.

## 1. Illinois Research Health Data.

The Illinois Research Health Data ( $\mathrm{R}_{\text {rod }}$ ) is described in Figure 2. Among the attributes listed there, I consider $Q I_{\text {rod }}=\{$ date of birth, gender, 5-digit ZIP $\}$ to be a quasi-identifier within $\mathrm{R}_{\text {rod }}$.

## 2. AHRQ's State Inpatient Database

The Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality's State Inpatient Database ( $\mathrm{R}_{\text {SID }}$ ) is described in part in Figure 3. Among the attributes listed there, I consider $Q I_{\text {SID } 1}=\{$ month and year of birth, gender, 5-digit ZIP\} to be a quasi-identifier within data released by some states and I consider QI $_{\text {SID } 2}=\{$ age, gender, 5 -digit ZIP\} to be a quasi-identifier within data released by other states.

### 4.3. Design and procedures

The experiments reported in the next section can be generally described in terms of values attributes can assume. Let $\mathrm{T}\left(A_{1}, \ldots, A_{n}\right)$ be an entity-specific table and let $Q_{T}$ be a quasiidentifier of T . $Q_{T}$ is represented as a finite set of attributes $\left\{A_{i}, \ldots, A_{j}\right\} \subseteq\left\{A_{1}, \ldots, A_{n}\right\}$. I write $\left|A_{m}\right|$ to represent the finite number of values $A_{m}$ can assume. So, the number of distinct possible values that be assigned to $Q_{T}$, written $\left|Q_{T}\right|$, is: $\left|Q_{T}\right|=\left|A_{i}\right| *\left|A_{i+1}\right| * \ldots{ }^{*}\left|A_{j}\right|$.

## Example.

Given $Q_{\text {dob }}=\left\{\right.$ date of birth, gender\}, then $\left|Q_{\text {dob }}\right|=365 * 76 * 2=55,480$ because there are 365 days in a year, an expected lifetime of 76 years, and 2 genders.

In this document, I am concerned with a person-specific table $T\left(A_{1}, \ldots, Z, \ldots, A_{n}\right)$ that includes a geographic attribute $Z$. Values assigned to a geographic attribute are specific to the residences of people. Examples of geographic attributes include 5-digit ZIP codes, names of cities and towns, and names of counties in which people reside. Let $U$ be the universe of all people and the person-specific table $\operatorname{Geo}\left[z_{i}, A_{r}, \ldots, A_{s}\right)$ contain all or almost all of the people of $U$ having $Z=z_{i}$. I say $\mathrm{Geo}_{z i}$ is a population register for $z_{i}$. And, $\mathrm{T}\left[A_{1}, \ldots Z_{i}, \ldots A_{n}\right]$ is a pseudo-random sample drawn from $\mathrm{Geo}\left[z_{i}, A_{r}, \ldots, A_{s}\right]$. Unique and unusual combinations of characteristics found in Geo with respect to $z_{i}$ can be no less unique or unusual when recorded in T . Therefore, the probability distribution of combinations of characteristics found in Geo limits the values those combinations of characteristics can assume in T. Determining unique and unusual combinations of characteristics within a residential domain is a counting problem.

## Theorem. Generalized Dirichlet drawer principle [13] (also known as the Generalized pigeonhole principle)

If $N$ objects are distributed in $k$ boxes, then there is at least one box containing at least $\lceil N$ / $k\rceil$ objects.

Proof.
Suppose that none of the boxes contain more than $\lceil N / k\rceil-1$ objects. Then, the total number of objects is at most: $k^{*}(\lceil N / k\rceil-1)<k^{*}(((N / k)+1)-1)=N$
This has the inequality $\lceil N / k\rceil<(N / k)+1$
This is a contradiction because there are a total of $N$ objects.

## Example.

Given a random sample of 500 people, there are at least $\lceil 500 / 365\rceil=2$ people with the same birthday because there are 365 possible birthdays.

Let $z_{i}$ be a 5-digit ZIP code. I write population $\left(z_{i}\right)$ to denote the number of people who reside in $z_{i}$ and population $\left(z_{i}\right) \equiv\left|\mathrm{Geo}_{z i}\right|$. If population $\left(Z_{i}\right)>\left|Q_{\text {dob }}\right|$, then by the generalized pigeonhole principle, a tuple $t \in \mathrm{R}_{\text {rod }}\left[\right.$ date of birth, gender, $z_{i}$ ] would not uniquely correspond to one person. In these cases, I say $t\left[A_{1}, \ldots\right.$, date of birth, gender, $\left.z_{i}, \ldots, A n\right]$ is not likely to be uniquely identifiable. On the other hand, if population $\left(z_{i}\right) \leq\left|Q_{d o b}\right|$ then by the generalized pigeonhole principle, a tuple $t \in \mathrm{R}_{\text {rool }}\left[\right.$ date of birth, gender, $z_{i}$ ] would likely relate to only one person. In these cases, I say $t\left[A_{1}, \ldots\right.$, date of birth, gender, $\left.z_{i}, \ldots, A n\right]$ is likely to be uniquely identifiable. This is the general approach to the experiments reported in the next section though each differs in terms of attribute specification.

### 4.3.1. Subdivision analyses

The analyses of the identifiability of geographically situated populations are based on age-based divisions within a geographic attribute. Let age subdivision $a$ be either Aunder12, A12to18, A19to24, A25to34, A35to44, A45to54, A55to64, or A65Plus. The quasi-identifier $Q_{a}$ has the same attributes as $Q_{\text {dob }}$ but values which date of birth can assume are limited by $a$. That is, $\left|Q_{a}\right|$ is the number of possible distinct values that can be assigned to $Q_{a}$. I say $\left|Q_{a}\right|$ is the threshold for $Q_{\text {dob }}$ with respect to age subdivision $a$.

## Example.

Given $Q_{\text {dob }}=\{$ date of birth, gender $\}$ and age subdivision $a=$ A19to24, then $\left|Q_{a}\right|=365$ * 2

* $6=4380$ because there are 365 birthdays, 2 genders and 6 years between the ages of 19 to 24 , inclusive.


## Number of subjects uniquely identified in a subdivision of a geographical area (ID ${ }_{a z i}$ )

Given a value for a geographic attribute, written $z_{i}$, and an age subdivision $a$, I write population $\left(z_{i}, a\right)$ as the number of people residing in $z_{i}$ with an age within $a$. The number of people considered uniquely identified by $a$ and $Z_{i}$, written $I D_{a z i}$, is determined by the rule:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \text { if population }\left(z_{i}, a\right) \geq\left|Q_{a}\right| \text {, then } I D_{a z i}=\text { population }\left(z_{i}, a\right) \\
& \text { else } I D_{a z i}=0 \text {. }
\end{aligned}
$$

By extension, the percentage of people residing in $z_{i}$ considered uniquely identified (written $I D_{z i}$ ) with respect to the set of age subdivisions is computed as:

$$
I D_{Z i}=\frac{\text { population }\left(z_{i}\right)-\sum_{a=A \text { AUder } 12}^{\text {A6SPlus }} I D_{a z i}}{\operatorname{population}\left(z_{i}\right)}
$$

### 4.3.2. Statistics on geographical areas

Statistics are reported on geographic regions. Given a geographic attribute $Z$, let Region $_{Z}$ $=\left\{z_{i} \mid z_{i} \in Z\right\}$ and AgeDivs $=\{$ Aunder12, A12to18, A19to24, A25to34, A35to44, A45to54, A55to64, A65Plus\}. That is, Region $_{Z}$ is a set of values that can be assigned to the geographic
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attribute $Z$ and AgeDivs is a set of age subdivisions. Region $_{Z}$ is partitioned into NotIDSet and IDSet based on age subdivision $a \in A g e D i v s$ such that:

$$
\begin{aligned}
\text { NotIDSet }_{\mathrm{za}} & =\left\{\left(z_{i}, a\right) \mid z_{i} \in \text { Region }_{Z} \text { and population }\left(z_{i}, a\right)>\left|Q_{a}\right|\right\} \\
\text { IDSet }_{\mathrm{za}} & =\left\{\left(z_{i}, a\right) \mid z_{i} \in \text { Region }_{\mathrm{Z}} \text { and population }\left(z_{i}, a\right) \leq\left|Q_{a}\right|\right\}
\end{aligned}
$$

The population of $\operatorname{NotIDSet}_{z}$ is not considered uniquely identifiable by values of $Q_{\text {dob }}$. The population of IDSet $_{z}$ is considered uniquely identifiable by values of $Q_{d o b}$. In the experiments, the following statistics are reported.

Maximum subpopulation( $\operatorname{NotIDSet}_{z a}$ ) $=\max \left(\right.$ population $\left.\left(z_{1}, a\right), \ldots, \operatorname{population}\left(z_{y}, a\right)\right)$, where $\left(z_{i}, a\right) \in$ NotIDSet $_{z a}$

Maximum subpopulation(IDSet $\left.{ }_{z a}\right)=\max \left(\operatorname{population}\left(z_{1}, a\right), \ldots, \operatorname{population}\left(z_{y}, a\right)\right)$, where $\left(z_{i}, a\right) \in$ IDSet $_{z a}$

Minimum subpopulation( $\operatorname{NotIDSet}_{z a}$ ) $=\min \left(\right.$ population $\left(z_{1}, a\right), \ldots$, population $\left.\left(z_{y}, a\right)\right)$, where $\left(z_{i}, a\right) \in \operatorname{NotIDSet}_{z a}$

Minimum subpopulation(IDSet $\left.{ }_{z a}\right)=\min \left(\operatorname{population}\left(z_{1}, a\right), \ldots\right.$, population $\left.\left(z_{y}, a\right)\right)$, where $\left(z_{i}, a\right) \in$ IDSet $_{z a}$

Average subpopulation $\left(\operatorname{NotIDSet}_{z a}\right)=\frac{\sum_{\left(z_{i}, a\right) \in \text { NotIDSet }} \operatorname{population}\left(z_{i}, a\right)}{\left|\operatorname{NotIDSet}_{\mathrm{za}}\right|}$

Average subpopulation $\left(\operatorname{IDSet}_{\mathrm{za}}\right)=\frac{\sum_{\left(\mathrm{z}_{i}, a\right) \in \operatorname{IDSet}} \operatorname{population}\left(\mathrm{z}_{i}, a\right)}{\left|\mathrm{IDSet}_{\mathrm{za}}\right|}$

Number of geoographical areas $\left(\right.$ NotIDSet $\left._{z \mathrm{z}}\right)=\mid$ NOTIDSet $_{\text {za }} \mid$

Number of geographical areas(IDSet $\left.{ }_{z a}\right)=\left|\operatorname{DSet}_{z a}\right|$

Percentage of geographical areas $\left(\operatorname{NotIDSet}_{z a}\right)=\frac{\left|\operatorname{NotIDSet}_{z a}\right|}{\left|\operatorname{NotIDSet}_{z a}\right|+\left|\operatorname{DSet}_{z a}\right|}$

Percentage of geographical areas $\left(\right.$ IDSet $\left._{\mathrm{za}}\right)=\frac{\left|\operatorname{IDSet}_{\mathrm{za}}\right|}{\left|\operatorname{NotIDSet}_{\mathrm{za}}\right|+\left|\mathrm{DSet}_{\mathrm{za}}\right|}$
L. Sweeney, Simple Demographics Often Identify People Uniquely. Carnegie Mellon University, Data Privacy Working Paper 3. Pittsburgh 2000.

| State |  | AUnder12 | A12to18 | A19to24 | A25to34 | A35to44 | A45to54 | A55to64 | A65Plus |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| AL | 4,040,587 | 699,554 | 425,425 | 369,639 | 652,466 | 585,299 | 422,565 | 363,033 | 522,606 |
| AK | 544,698 | 123,789 | 53,662 | 46,478 | 111,790 | 101,699 | 55,887 | 29,236 | 22,157 |
| AZ | 3,665,228 | 678,439 | 352,557 | 333,055 | 639,702 | 530,192 | 354,711 | 299,372 | 477,200 |
| AR | 2,350,725 | 410,665 | 246,486 | 197,424 | 361,268 | 328,397 | 244,096 | 212,573 | 349,816 |
| CA | 29,755,274 | 5,436,303 | 2,722,076 | 2,904,739 | 5,738,645 | 4,645,553 | 2,955,455 | 2,231,171 | 3,121,332 |
| CO | 3,293,771 | 599,278 | 305,595 | 282,268 | 617,333 | 570,797 | 340,276 | 249,924 | 328,300 |
| CT | 3,287,116 | 517,724 | 275,158 | 295,271 | 588,185 | 509,760 | 360,488 | 294,866 | 445,664 |
| DE | 666,168 | 113,963 | 58,980 | 64,726 | 119,782 | 100,110 | 68,367 | 59,570 | 80,670 |
| DC | 606,900 | 80,760 | 45,404 | 71,605 | 122,777 | 94,984 | 62,648 | 51,050 | 77,672 |
| FL | 12,686,788 | 1,931,088 | 1,041,486 | 1,010,156 | 2,102,614 | 1,778,994 | 1,283,728 | 1,235,820 | 2,302,902 |
| GA | 6,478,847 | 1,171,969 | 659,386 | 623,625 | 1,182,367 | 1,014,579 | 678,987 | 495,259 | 652,675 |
| HI | 1,108,229 | 195,278 | 98,594 | 104,537 | 203,466 | 178,406 | 109,493 | 93,778 | 124,677 |
| ID | 1,006,749 | 207,979 | 115,708 | 81,770 | 154,087 | 149,338 | 98,910 | 77,819 | 121,138 |
| IL | 11,429,942 | 2,012,780 | 1,102,499 | 1,021,458 | 2,003,217 | 1,702,509 | 1,179,345 | 974,035 | 1,434,099 |
| IN | 5,543,954 | 975,582 | 568,654 | 510,374 | 919,924 | 819,577 | 572,585 | 481,329 | 695,929 |
| IA | 2,776,442 | 487,879 | 271,630 | 240,359 | 430,947 | 397,287 | 272,959 | 249,594 | 425,787 |
| KS | 2,474,885 | 457,755 | 236,911 | 216,092 | 416,003 | 363,571 | 234,451 | 208,146 | 341,956 |
| KY | 3,673,969 | 626,236 | 383,356 | 337,585 | 610,721 | 549,204 | 380,791 | 320,712 | 465,364 |
| LA | 4,219,973 | 836,481 | 458,677 | 387,821 | 710,773 | 606,119 | 412,186 | 340,483 | 467,433 |
| ME | 1,226,626 | 210,082 | 117,015 | 104,754 | 205,713 | 194,139 | 123,745 | 108,198 | 162,980 |
| MD | 4,771,143 | 812,147 | 409,957 | 431,840 | 901,956 | 774,414 | 528,246 | 395,946 | 516,637 |
| MA | 6,011,978 | 933,306 | 506,033 | 613,116 | 1,104,645 | 914,852 | 605,951 | 514,398 | 819,677 |
| MI | 9,295,222 | 1,671,777 | 930,841 | 850,016 | 1,583,364 | 1,408,199 | 950,316 | 793,711 | 1,106,998 |
| MN | 4,370,288 | 815,963 | 409,705 | 377,084 | 783,562 | 666,480 | 428,315 | 343,315 | 545,864 |
| MS | 2,573,216 | 495,074 | 298,599 | 240,546 | 403,754 | 351,197 | 249,684 | 213,117 | 321,245 |

Figure 8 Population by state and age group, part 1

| State |  | AUnder12 | A12to18 | A19to24 | A25to34 | A35to44 | A45to54 | A55to64 | A65Plus |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| MO | 5,113,266 | 897,590 | 490,067 | 436,468 | 855,640 | 734,252 | 524,756 | 457,095 | 717,398 |
| MT | 799,065 | 150,406 | 83,457 | 57,351 | 123,913 | 128,067 | 81,522 | 67,930 | 106,419 |
| NE | 1,577,600 | 294,659 | 156,790 | 130,613 | 259,709 | 229,478 | 148,720 | 134,711 | 222,920 |
| NV | 1,201,833 | 208,695 | 100,891 | 102,609 | 223,599 | 192,324 | 138,893 | 107,621 | 127,201 |
| NH | 1,109,252 | 195,970 | 98,977 | 100,411 | 205,815 | 183,649 | 111,387 | 88,059 | 124,984 |
| NJ | 7,730,188 | 1,217,936 | 681,960 | 664,059 | 1,366,267 | 1,200,167 | 850,983 | 718,589 | 1,030,227 |
| NM | 1,515,069 | 307,898 | 160,598 | 123,983 | 259,975 | 229,577 | 149,712 | 120,808 | 162,518 |
| NY | 17,990,026 | 2,891,618 | 1,615,696 | 1,664,461 | 3,148,965 | 2,720,452 | 1,944,539 | 1,642,487 | 2,361,808 |
| NC | 6,628,637 | 1,074,691 | 637,603 | 662,849 | 1,152,229 | 1,008,277 | 705,099 | 585,832 | 802,057 |
| ND | 637,713 | 119,767 | 65,036 | 57,151 | 104,833 | 90,808 | 56,215 | 53,132 | 90,771 |
| OH | 10,846,581 | 1,899,661 | 1,064,732 | 957,750 | 1,805,063 | 1,619,291 | 1,115,355 | 978,701 | 1,406,028 |
| OK | 3,145,585 | 563,941 | 318,809 | 267,411 | 514,663 | 452,308 | 326,770 | 278,089 | 423,594 |
| OR | 2,842,321 | 495,834 | 265,630 | 225,488 | 455,371 | 476,343 | 297,101 | 235,423 | 391,131 |
| PA | 11,881,643 | 1,892,957 | 1,074,128 | 1,041,626 | 1,918,168 | 1,739,212 | 1,224,867 | 1,160,974 | 1,829,711 |
| RI | 1,003,211 | 155,439 | 86,271 | 102,680 | 174,149 | 146,571 | 97,958 | 89,156 | 150,987 |
| SC | 3,486,703 | 616,373 | 363,140 | 339,600 | 596,534 | 526,103 | 357,747 | 291,077 | 396,129 |
| SD | 695,133 | 137,110 | 71,070 | 56,976 | 109,919 | 96,063 | 61,962 | 59,623 | 102,410 |
| TN | 4,896,046 | 812,832 | 484,155 | 452,701 | 823,042 | 740,485 | 530,654 | 433,773 | 618,404 |
| TX | 16,984,748 | 3,320,887 | 1,776,426 | 1,578,004 | 3,118,515 | 2,548,657 | 1,649,538 | 1,284,825 | 1,707,896 |
| UT | 1,722,850 | 430,959 | 226,933 | 167,637 | 275,853 | 224,715 | 139,656 | 107,405 | 149,692 |
| VT | 562,758 | 99,365 | 53,099 | 53,049 | 95,880 | 92,804 | 57,274 | 45,118 | 66,169 |
| VA | 6,184,493 | 1,030,088 | 564,690 | 616,835 | 1,147,609 | 991,563 | 670,457 | 500,955 | 662,296 |
| WA | 4,866,692 | 878,141 | 444,693 | 417,468 | 861,441 | 804,413 | 504,238 | 380,725 | 575,573 |
| WV | 1,792,969 | 279,885 | 192,881 | 148,808 | 262,961 | 270,784 | 191,957 | 176,960 | 268,733 |
| WI | 4,891,452 | 887,426 | 472,270 | 437,743 | 825,056 | 726,753 | 478,819 | 412,492 | 650,893 |
| WY | 453,588 | 92,123 | 49,716 | 33,980 | 75,462 | 74,182 | 45,541 | 35,539 | 47,045 |
| USA | 248,418,140 | 43,454,102 | 23,694,112 | 22,614,049 | 43,429,692 | 37,582,954 | 25,435,905 | 21,083,554 | 31,123,772 |

Figure 9 Population by state and age group, part 2

Different experiments have different age and geographic attributes. See Figure 11 for a list of all 13 experiments identified as A through M . So, $Q_{d o b}$ and $Z_{i}$, as used above, are representative of several quasi-identifiers that have varying specifications. In experiment $B$ through experiment $\mathrm{E}, Z_{i} \in\{$ ZIP codes in USA in which people reside $\}$. In experiment F through experiment $I, Z_{i} \in\{$ Cities, municipalities, towns and recognized post office names in the USA $\}$. Finally, in experiment $J$ through experiment $M, Z_{i} \in\{$ Counties in the USA\}. Similarly, in experiments $\mathrm{B}, \mathrm{F}$, and $\mathrm{J}, Q_{\text {dob }}=\left\{\right.$ date of birth, gender\}. In experiments $\mathrm{C}, \mathrm{G}$ and $\mathrm{K}, Q_{\text {dob }}=$ \{month and year of birth, gender\}. In experiments $\mathrm{D}, \mathrm{H}$ and $\mathrm{L}, \mathrm{Q}_{\text {dob }}=\{$ year of birth, gender $\}$. Finally, in experiments E, I and M, $Q_{\text {dob }}=\{2$ year age subdivision, gender $\}$.

For completeness, Figure 8 and Figure 9 report the total population per state of each age group. These values are used to compute percentages throughout this document unless otherwise noted.

### 4.4. Special data elements

This section compares age and year of birth values, as well as, 5-digit ZIP codes, places and counties.

### 4.4.1. Age versus Year of Birth

Values for an age attribute do not necessarily translate to known values for a year of birth attribute. There are two cases to consider. If there exists a date to which values for age can be referenced, then corresponding values for year of birth can be confidently computed. For example, in SID, states calculate the patient's age in years at the time of admission [14]. Because both the computed age and the date of admission are released, the patient's year of birth can be confidently determined. In experiment D, H and L, I examine age as providing a distinct year of birth, and so $Q I_{S I D 2}=\{$ age, gender, 5 -digit ZIP $\}$ can be considered as $Q I_{S I D 2}=\{$ year of birth, gender, 5-digit ZIP\}.

On the other hand, if values for date of admission were not released, values for age would be calendar year specific. In such cases, data are collected with respect to a particular calendar year (that is known) but not a particular day within that year. As a result, each value for age corresponds to two possible values for each person's year of birth. During any given calendar year, a person reports two ages. The first age occurs before the person's birthday and the second occurs on and after the person's birthday. Because each person's birthday can appear at any time during the calendar year (in contrast to societies in which everyone's "birthday", in terms of determining age, occurs on the same day), two values can be inferred for year of birth from a recorded value for age. In the experiment E, I and M, I examine $\{2$ yr age subdivision, gender, 5digit ZIP\} in which the birth year is within a known 2-year range.

### 4.4.2. Comparison of 5-digit ZIP codes, Places and Counties

Figure 10 shows a comparison of 5-digit ZIP codes, places and counties in the United States. There are a total of 29,343 ZIP codes, 25,688 places and 3,141 counties. The state having the largest number of counties was Texas (with 254). The District of Columbia had the fewest number of counties (with 1). The average number of counties per state was 62 and the standard deviation was 47.
L. Sweeney, Simple Demographics Often Identify People Uniquely. Carnegie Mellon University, Data Privacy Working Paper 3. Pittsburgh 2000.


Figure 10 Number of 5-digit ZIP codes, Places and Counties by State

## 5. Results

In the previous sections, I defined terminology and introduced the materials that will be used. In this section, I report on experiments I conducted to estimate the number of unique occurrences for various combinations of demographic attributes that are typically released in publicly and semi-publicly available data.

```
Experiment A: Uniqueness of {ZIP, gender, date of birth} assume uniform age distribution
Experiment B: Uniqueness of {ZIP, gender, date of birth} based on actual age distribution
Experiment C: Uniqueness of {ZIP, gender, month and year of birth}
Experiment D: Uniqueness of {ZIP, gender, age}
Experiment E: Uniqueness of {ZIP, gender, 2yr age range}
Experiment F: Uniqueness of {place/city, gender, date of birth}
Experiment G: Uniqueness of {place/city, gender, month and year of birth}
Experiment H: Uniqueness of {place/city, gender, age}
Experiment I: Uniqueness of {place/city, gender, 2yr age range}
Experiment J: Uniqueness of {county, gender, date of birth}
Experiment K: Uniqueness of {county, gender, month and year of birth}
Experiment L: Uniqueness of {county, gender, age}
Experiment M: Uniqueness of {county, gender, 2yr age range}
```

Figure 11 List of 13 experiments
L. Sweeney, Simple Demographics Often Identify People Uniquely. Carnegie Mellon University, Data Privacy Working Paper 3. Pittsburgh 2000.

A total of 13 experiments were conducted [15]. These are identified below. Only experiment B, C, D, F and J are briefly reported in this document. Figure 32 contains a summary of results from all 13 experiments.

### 5.1. Experiment B: Uniqueness of $\{Z I P$, gender, date of birth $\}$

Recall, Illinois Research Health Data named ROD provides an example of shared data that contains demographic attributes; in particular, $Q I_{\text {rod }}=$ \{date of birth, gender, 5-digit ZIP\}. This experiment shows that medical conditions included in these data can be attributed uniquely to one person in most cases.

### 5.1.1. Experiment B Design

Step 1. Use ZIP table for each of the 50 states and the District of Columbia. Step 2. Figure 12 contains the thresholds for $Q=\{$ gender, date of birth $\}$ specific to each age subdivision. Step 3. Report statistical measurements computed from the table in step 1 using the thresholds determined in step 2. Figure 13 and Figure 14 report the results.

| Q = \{gender, date of birth $\}$ |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\left\|\mathrm{Q}_{\text {AUnder12 }}\right\|$ | $=2 * 365 * 12$ | = 8,760 |
| $\left\|\mathrm{Q}_{\mathrm{A} 12 \text { to18 }}\right\|$ | = 2 * $365 * 7$ | = 5,110 |
| $\left\|\mathrm{Q}_{\text {A19to24 }}\right\|$ | $=2 * 365 * 6$ | = 4,380 |
| $\left\|\mathrm{Q}_{\mathrm{A} 25 \text { to34 }}\right\|$ | = 2 * 365 * 10 | = 7,300 |
| $\mid Q^{\text {A355044 }}$ \| | = 2 * 365 * 10 | = 7,300 |
| $\left\|\mathrm{Q}_{\text {A45to54 }}\right\|$ | = 2 * 365 * 10 | = 7,300 |
| $\mid \mathrm{Q}_{\text {A55to64 }}{ }^{\text {a }}$ | $=2 * 365 * 10$ | = 7,300 |
| $\left\|Q_{\text {A65Plus }}\right\|$ | $=2 * 365 * 12$ | = 8,760 |

Figure 12 Number of possible values for each age subdivision \{gender, date of birth\}

### 5.1.2. Experiment B Results

Figure 13 and Figure 14 show the results from applying the 3 steps of experiment B to each state, the District of Columbia and the entire United States. The percentages computed for each locale appear in the column named "RANGE \%ID_pop." The last row in Figure 14 reports the results of applying the 3 steps of experiment B to all ZIP codes in the United States. As shown, $87.1 \%$ of the population of the United States is likely to be uniquely identified by values of $\{$ gender, date of birth, ZIP\} when age subdivisions are considered.

During the analysis of experiment B, many interesting ZIP codes were found. Here are a few. The ZIP code 11794 in the State of New York is small and extremely homogenous. 4666 of its total population of 5418 (or $86 \%$ ) are in the age subdivision of 19 to 24 . This is the home of the State University of New York at Sony Brook. The ZIP code 10475 in the State of New York reportedly has a larger population of 37077 , but people are distributed somewhat evenly across the age subdivisions making the population in each range less than its corresponding threshold. The ZIP code 01701 in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts reportedly has a population of 65,001 , which is the largest population for a ZIP code in the state. In experiment A, any person residing in that ZIP code would NOT have been considered likely to be uniquely identified by \{gender, date of birth, ZIP\}; however, only the subpopulation between the ages of 19 and 44 in
L. Sweeney, Simple Demographics Often Identify People Uniquely. Carnegie Mellon University, Data Privacy Working Paper 3. Pittsburgh 2000.
that ZIP code is large enough not to be considered uniquely identified by \{gender, date of birth, ZIP\}. Persons residing in that ZIP code, who are not in that age subdivision, are less common and considered likely to be uniquely identified by \{gender, date of birth, ZIP\} even though the population in the entire ZIP code is the largest in the state.

| RANGE |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| State | \#ZIPs | Population | \%population | AUnder12 | A12to18 | A19to24 | A25to34 | A35to44 | A45to54 | A55to64 | A65Plus |
| AL | 567 | 4,040,587 | 99\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% | 89.7\% | 98.7\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% |
| AK | 195 | 544,698 | 100\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% |
| AZ | 270 | 3,665,228 | 82\% | 82.3\% | 90.1\% | 67.4\% | 64.3\% | 88.8\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% | 80.7\% |
| AR | 578 | 2,350,725 | 98\% | 97.8\% | 100.0\% | 87.1\% | 95.3\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% |
| CA | 1,515 | 29,755,274 | 71\% | 62.4\% | 73.1\% | 54.9\% | 47.2\% | 70.0\% | 96.8\% | 99.6\% | 96.8\% |
| CO | 414 | 3,293,771 | 92\% | 89.7\% | 96.2\% | 85.0\% | 81.1\% | 92.1\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% |
| CT | 263 | 3,287,116 | 91\% | 94.3\% | 98.1\% | 76.1\% | 76.2\% | 88.9\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% | 97.8\% |
| DE | 53 | 666,168 | 91\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% | 72.0\% | 66.7\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% |
| DC | 24 | 606,900 | 64\% | 62.0\% | 74.9\% | 32.5\% | 47.6\% | 55.3\% | 100.0\% | 84.9\% | 85.1\% |
| FL | 804 | 12,686,788 | 91\% | 93.9\% | 95.8\% | 87.5\% | 85.2\% | 94.3\% | 98.6\% | 99.2\% | 83.6\% |
| GA | 636 | 6,478,847 | 90\% | 90.4\% | 93.5\% | 80.4\% | 77.8\% | 87.6\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% |
| HI | 80 | 1,108,229 | 74\% | 62.5\% | 94.4\% | 56.7\% | 55.9\% | 71.9\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% | 83.7\% |
| ID | 244 | 1,006,749 | 99\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% | 85.6\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% |
| IL | 1,236 | 11,429,942 | 75\% | 73.0\% | 76.4\% | 59.2\% | 60.1\% | 73.9\% | 90.3\% | 93.9\% | 86.7\% |
| IN | 675 | 5,543,954 | 94\% | 94.3\% | 95.2\% | 80.4\% | 85.4\% | 94.7\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% |
| IA | 922 | 2,776,442 | 98\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% | 78.9\% | 98.0\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% |
| KS | 713 | 2,474,885 | 98\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% | 83.1\% | 94.1\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% |
| KY | 810 | 3,673,969 | 98\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% | 85.7\% | 97.5\% | 98.6\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% |
| LA | 469 | 4,219,973 | 91\% | 89.8\% | 91.7\% | 80.4\% | 83.6\% | 93.0\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% |
| ME | 410 | 1,226,626 | 98\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% | 86.3\% | 96.3\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% |
| MD | 419 | 4,771,143 | 83\% | 84.8\% | 94.1\% | 79.2\% | 63.7\% | 80.2\% | 93.8\% | 100.0\% | 88.7\% |
| MA | 473 | 6,011,978 | 91\% | 95.7\% | 97.9\% | 73.5\% | 74.8\% | 92.8\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% | 98.8\% |
| MI | 875 | 9,295,222 | 85\% | 80.5\% | 84.7\% | 72.5\% | 74.5\% | 83.2\% | 98.2\% | 99.1\% | 98.3\% |
| MN | 877 | 4,370,288 | 95\% | 96.2\% | 100.0\% | 81.8\% | 87.7\% | 97.4\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% |
| MS | 363 | 2,573,216 | 98\% | 98.2\% | 98.1\% | 88.3\% | 100.0\% | 97.8\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% |

Figure 13 Uniqueness of \{ZIP, Gender, Date of birth\} respecting age distribution, part 1

| RANGE |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| State | \#ZIPs | Population | \%population | AUnder12 | A12to18 | A19to24 | A25to34\| | A35to44 | A45to54 | A55to64 | A65Plus |
| MO | 993 | 5,113,266 | 94\% | 94.4\% | 98.8\% | 86.9\% | 86.8\% | 92.1\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% | 97.3\% |
| MT | 315 | 799,065 | 98\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% | 78.9\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% |
| NE | 572 | 1,577,600 | 99\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% | 90.2\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% |
| NV | 104 | 1,201,833 | 86\% | 79.5\% | 94.3\% | 79.5\% | 66.9\% | 88.3\% | 94.6\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% |
| NH | 218 | 1,109,252 | 97\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% | 94.1\% | 88.5\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% |
| NJ | 540 | 7,730,188 | 92\% | 92.6\% | 93.1\% | 88.0\% | 79.8\% | 92.9\% | 99.1\% | 100.0\% | 94.1\% |
| NM | 276 | 1,515,069 | 88\% | 86.1\% | 89.0\% | 88.6\% | 71.6\% | 82.4\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% |
| NY | 1,594 | 17,990,026 | 76\% | 74.3\% | 77.3\% | 64.1\% | 60.0\% | 72.1\% | 88.3\% | 93.4\% | 85.5\% |
| NC | 705 | 6,628,637 | 94\% | 98.1\% | 96.4\% | 77.5\% | 86.4\% | 96.5\% | 98.8\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% |
| ND | 387 | 637,713 | 96\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% | 68.5\% | 91.9\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% |
| OH | 1,007 | 10,846,581 | 92\% | 92.2\% | 94.7\% | 82.4\% | 82.5\% | 93.6\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% | 98.5\% |
| OK | 586 | 3,145,585 | 97\% | 96.7\% | 100.0\% | 85.2\% | 93.5\% | 96.7\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% |
| OR | 384 | 2,842,321 | 97\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% | 89.5\% | 90.6\% | 93.1\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% |
| PA | 1,458 | 11,881,643 | 91\% | 90.5\% | 94.0\% | 80.1\% | 82.2\% | 90.3\% | 99.3\% | 99.4\% | 94.3\% |
| RI | 69 | 1,003,211 | 92\% | 94.4\% | 100.0\% | 71.1\% | 84.2\% | 94.9\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% | 94.2\% |
| SC | 350 | 3,486,703 | 91\% | 90.0\% | 95.1\% | 74.8\% | 79.5\% | 95.0\% | 97.9\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% |
| SD | 383 | 695,133 | 96\% | 92.7\% | 100.0\% | 81.4\% | 91.6\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% |
| TN | 583 | 4,896,046 | 93\% | 93.7\% | 94.8\% | 80.5\% | 87.1\% | 93.5\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% |
| TX | 1,672 | 16,984,748 | 88\% | 85.0\% | 89.1\% | 78.8\% | 76.5\% | 90.0\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% |
| UT | 205 | 1,722,850 | 87\% | 75.8\% | 80.0\% | 78.0\% | 90.2\% | 92.6\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% |
| VT | 243 | 562,758 | 98\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% | 80.1\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% |
| VA | 820 | 6,184,493 | 87\% | 88.2\% | 91.6\% | 71.9\% | 75.5\% | 82.7\% | 97.8\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% |
| WA | 484 | 4,866,692 | 92\% | 94.6\% | 100.0\% | 82.8\% | 82.5\% | 87.2\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% |
| WV | 655 | 1,792,969 | 97\% | 96.7\% | 96.4\% | 90.2\% | 95.7\% | 96.4\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% | 96.5\% |
| WI | 714 | 4,891,452 | 92\% | 88.9\% | 97.7\% | 77.6\% | 86.4\% | 92.6\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% |
| WY | 141 | 453,588 | 98\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% | 79.2\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% | 100.0\% |
| USA | 29,343 | 248,418,140 | 87\% | 85.8\% | 90.2\% | 75.0\% | 75.1\% | 87.0\% | 97.8\% | 99.0\% | 95.3\% |

Figure 14 Uniqueness of \{ZIP, Gender, Date of birth\} respecting age distribution, part 2

Figure 15 plots the percentage of the population considered identifiable in each ZIP code in the United States based on experiment B's criteria. The horizontal axis represents the
population that resides in the ZIP code. The vertical axis represents the percentage of the population considered uniquely identified by values of $Q=\{$ date of birth, gender, 5 -digit ZIP\} for a particular ZIP code. The criteria for computing the percentage of the population considered identifiable in experiment B is based on binary decisions, where each decision considers whether a sufficient number of people in a particular age subdivision reside in a particular ZIP code. If so, that sub-population is not considered identifiable; otherwise, its entire sub-population is considered identifiable.


Figure 15 Percentage of Population Identifiable Based on Age subdivisions in ZIP Population

Most ZIP codes (27697 of 29212 or $95 \%$ ) in the United States that have people listed as residing within them do not have enough people in any age subdivision to consider any such subpopulation as identifiable. This is evidenced in Figure 15 by the appearance of dots where the $\%$ pop identifiable is 1 . The largest population having \%pop identifiable $=1$ consists of 48,549 total people. There are very few ZIP codes (15 of 29212) in Figure 15 having sufficient numbers of people in each age subdivision that each such sub-population is not considered uniquely identifiable. This is evidenced in Figure 15 by the appearance of dots where the \%pop identifiable is 0 . The largest population having \%pop identifiable $=0$ has 99,995 people and the smallest has 73,321.

The ZIP code having the largest population, ZIP 60623 with 112,167 people, has a percentage of its population considered identifiable in Figure 15 as being only 11\%. It is not $0 \%$ because there are insufficient numbers of people above the age of 55 living there despite the large number of people residing in the ZIP code. The point representing this ZIP code in Figure 15 is the rightmost point shown.

The lowest leftmost point shown in Figure 15 corresponds to ZIP 11794, which was discussed earlier. It has a total population of 5418 people and consists primarily of people between the ages of 19 and 24 ( 4666 of 5418 or $86 \%$ ). Despite having a small population, the people residing there are very homogenous in terms of age and so the percentage of its population
considered identifiable based on experiment B's criteria is only $13 \%$. It is clear from these examples that population size alone is not an absolute predictor of the identifiability of the people residing within. Care must be taken to model the population as precisely as possible to insure privacy protection.


Figure 16 Percentage of Age-based Populations Identifiable within ZIP Population, Part 1

Recall the computation of the percentage of the population considered uniquely identified by values of $Q=\{$ date of birth, gender, 5-digit ZIP\} for a particular ZIP code in experiment B is based on a composite of binary decisions. Each binary decision concerns the number of people residing within a specific ZIP code in a particular age subdivision. Figure 16 and Figure 17 show plots of the percentage of sub-populations considered identifiable in each ZIP code in the United States based on experiment B's criteria. The horizontal axis represents the population that resides in the ZIP code. The vertical axis represents the percentage of the population considered uniquely identified by values of $Q=\{$ date of birth, gender, 5-digit ZIP\} for a particular ZIP code and a particular age subdivision. If a sufficient number of people within an age subdivision are reported as residing in a particular ZIP code, then that sub-population is considered identifiable; otherwise, the entire sub-population is not considered identifiable.

Figure 18 provides statistical highlights from the plots in Figure 16 and Figure 17. The topmost table provides statistics on ZIP codes in which the number of people within the noted age subdivision is less than or equal to the threshold for that subdivision. In these cases, the subpopulation within the ZIP code is considered uniquely identifiable; that is, \%pop_Identifiable = 1 for that age subdivision and ZIP code. The bottom table provides statistics in cases where \%pop_Identifiable < 1 . In these ZIP codes, the number of people within the noted age subdivision
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is greater than the threshold for that subdivision; therefore, this subdivision is not considered uniquely identifiable.


Figure 17 Percentage of Age-based Populations Identifiable within ZIP Population, Part 2

| Sub-population considered uniquely identifiable (<= threshold, IDSet) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
|  | AUnder12 | A12to18 | A19to24 | A25to34 | A35to44 | A45to54 | A55to64 | A65Plus |
| Max ZIP population | 107197 | 107197 | 66722 | 60388 | 62031 | 99420 | 112167 | 112167 |
| Min ZIP population | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Average ZIP population | 7615 | 7873 | 7332 | 6911 | 7596 | 8358 | 8442 | 8311 |
| standard deviation | 19452 | 10915 | 10070 | 9227 | 10393 | 11938 | 12165 | 11956 |
| Number of ZIP codes | 28675 | 28860 | 28352 | 28105 | 28665 | 29148 | 29187 | 29081 |
| Percentage ZIP codes | $98.2 \%$ | $98.8 \%$ | $97.1 \%$ | $96.2 \%$ | $98.1 \%$ | $99.8 \%$ | $99.9 \%$ | $99.6 \%$ |

Sub-population NOT considered uniquely identifiable (> threshold, NotIDSet)

|  | AUnder12 | A12to18 | A19to24 | A25to34 | A35to44 | A45to54 | A55to64 | A65Plus |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Max ZIP population | 112167 | 112167 | 112167 | 112167 | 112167 | 112167 | 107197 | 107197 |
| Min ZIP population | 28294 | 35092 | 5418 | 20211 | 30577 | 34860 | 60388 | 12890 |
| Average ZIP population | 55958 | 60254 | 47153 | 48944 | 56072 | 74798 | 80513 | 51313 |
| standard deviation | 12770 | 13036 | 17178 | 12681 | 13157 | 15961 | 12304 | 20367 |
| Number of ZIP codes | 537 | 352 | 860 | 1107 | 547 | 64 | 25 | 131 |
| Percentage ZIP codes | $1.8 \%$ | $1.2 \%$ | $2.9 \%$ | $3.8 \%$ | $1.9 \%$ | $0.2 \%$ | $0.1 \%$ | $0.4 \%$ |

Figure 18 Statistical highlights from Figure 16 and Figure 17

### 5.2. Experiment C: Uniqueness of $\{Z I P$, gender, month and year of birth $\}$

This experiment (referred to as experiment C ) is motivated by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality's State Inpatient Database ( $\mathrm{R}_{\text {SID }}$ ), which is described in part in Figure 3. Among the attributes listed there, I consider $Q I_{\text {SID } 1}=$ \{month and year of birth, gender, 5 -digit $Z I P\}$ to be a quasi-identifier within data released by some states. This experiment attempts to characterize the identifiability of $Q I_{\text {SID1 }}$.

### 5.2.1. Experiment C Design

Step 1. Use ZIP table for each of the 50 states and the District of Columbia. Step 2. Figure 19 contains the thresholds for $Q=\{$ gender, month and year of birth\} specific to each age subdivision. Step 3. Report statistical measurements computed from the table in step 1 using the thresholds determined in step 2. Figure 20 and Figure 21 report the results.

| Q3 = \{gender, month and year of birth $\}$ |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\left\|\mathrm{Q} 3_{\text {AUnderr12 }}\right\|$ | $=2 * 12 * 12$ | $=288$ |
| $\mid \mathrm{Q3}^{\text {A12to18 }}$ \| | $=2 * 12 * 7$ | = 168 |
|  | $=2 * 12 * 6$ | = 144 |
| $\mid \mathrm{Q3}^{\text {a25to34 }}$ \| | $=2 * 12 * 10$ | = 240 |
| $\mid \mathrm{Q3}^{\text {a35to44 }}$ \| | $=2 * 12 * 10$ | $=240$ |
| $\mid \mathrm{Q3}^{\text {A45to54 }}$ \| | $=2 * 12 * 10$ | $=240$ |
| $\mid \mathrm{Q3}^{\text {a55to64 }}$ \| | $=2 * 12 * 10$ | $=240$ |
| \|Q3 ${ }_{\text {A65Plus }}$ \| | $=2 * 12 * 12$ | $=288$ |

Figure 19 Number of possible values for each age subdivision for \{gender, month and year of birth\}

### 5.2.2. Experiment C Results

Figure 20 and Figure 21 show the results of applying the 3 steps of experiment $C$ to each state, the District of Columbia (as just reported) and the entire United States. The percentage of people residing in each locale likely to be uniquely identifiable based on \{gender, month and year of birth, ZIP\} appear in the column named "MonYr \%ID_pop." For example, 18.1\% of the population of Iowa (see Figure 20) and $26.5 \%$ of the population of North Dakota (see Figure 21) are likely to be uniquely identifiable based on \{gender, month and year of birth, ZIP\}.

The next to last row in Figure 21 labeled "USA" reports the results of applying the 3 steps of experiment C to all ZIP codes in the United States. As shown, $3.7 \%$ of the population of the United States is likely to be uniquely identified by values of \{gender, month and year of birth, ZIP\}. The last row in Figure 21 labeled "\%ID_pop" displays the percentage of people in each age subdivision who are likely to be uniquely identified by values of \{gender, month and year of birth, ZIP\}. For example, it reports that $5 \%$ of the population of persons residing in the United States between the ages of 45 and 54 are likely to be uniquely identifiable based on \{gender, month and year of birth, ZIP\}.

Figure 22 plots the percentage of the population considered identifiable in each ZIP code in the United States based on experiment C's criteria. The horizontal axis represents the population that resides in the ZIP code. The vertical axis represents the percentage of the
L. Sweeney, Simple Demographics Often Identify People Uniquely. Carnegie Mellon University, Data Privacy Working Paper 3. Pittsburgh 2000.
population considered uniquely identified by values of $Q I_{\text {SID } 1}=\{$ month and year of birth, gender, 5-digit ZIP\} for a particular ZIP code. This is the same as the approach used in experiment B.

|  | MonYr |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| State | \%ID_pop | AUnder12 | A12to18 | A19to24 | A25to34 | A35to44 | A45to54 | A55to64 | A65Plus |
| AL | $3.8 \%$ | 22,253 | 11,325 | 10,982 | 18,197 | 19,285 | 22,443 | 24,806 | 24,254 |
| AK | $10.7 \%$ | 12,416 | 6,542 | 4,826 | 9,045 | 7,633 | 6,253 | 5,522 | 6,063 |
| AZ | $1.4 \%$ | 6,804 | 3,888 | 4,386 | 6,786 | 5,968 | 7,091 | 7,095 | 8,120 |
| AR | $11.4 \%$ | 41,221 | 23,185 | 20,274 | 34,340 | 35,164 | 35,248 | 35,440 | 42,675 |
| CA | $0.8 \%$ | 33,588 | 19,440 | 16,982 | 27,467 | 26,335 | 31,331 | 33,500 | 34,743 |
| CO | $3.7 \%$ | 18,174 | 10,214 | 8,764 | 14,721 | 14,523 | 16,946 | 17,965 | 21,333 |
| CT | $1.2 \%$ | 5,203 | 2,845 | 3,097 | 4,102 | 3,675 | 5,104 | 7,135 | 7,514 |
| DE | $0.9 \%$ | 867 | 557 | 257 | 653 | 652 | 960 | 715 | 1,627 |
| DC | $0.2 \%$ | 275 | 72 | 26 | 180 | 95 | 66 | 57 | 404 |
| FL | $0.6 \%$ | 10,862 | 6,777 | 6,548 | 8,311 | 9,208 | 11,647 | 11,760 | 13,330 |
| GA | $2.7 \%$ | 19,935 | 11,272 | 11,318 | 18,321 | 22,193 | 26,345 | 31,161 | 34,905 |
| HI | $1.6 \%$ | 1,767 | 1,242 | 1,602 | 1,911 | 1,795 | 2,797 | 3,645 | 3,469 |
| ID | $8.9 \%$ | 11,922 | 7,146 | 6,950 | 11,657 | 11,988 | 12,404 | 12,220 | 15,587 |
| IL | $4.4 \%$ | 75,604 | 42,727 | 40,364 | 62,012 | 63,393 | 68,919 | 70,997 | 77,971 |
| IN | $4.0 \%$ | 28,592 | 16,297 | 17,739 | 25,328 | 25,849 | 33,632 | 34,730 | 36,884 |
| IA | $18.1 \%$ | 82,724 | 44,905 | 34,644 | 70,040 | 64,634 | 65,878 | 65,808 | 72,916 |
| KS | $12.1 \%$ | 46,345 | 25,207 | 20,797 | 36,178 | 38,319 | 40,822 | 41,630 | 49,544 |
| KY | $8.3 \%$ | 48,404 | 24,728 | 23,501 | 37,727 | 39,465 | 41,358 | 43,680 | 46,346 |
| LA | $2.8 \%$ | 15,800 | 8,567 | 8,553 | 13,180 | 13,922 | 17,090 | 18,399 | 22,675 |
| ME | $15.5 \%$ | 29,727 | 16,098 | 14,462 | 23,099 | 23,470 | 26,896 | 26,041 | 30,713 |
| MD | $2.1 \%$ | 14,087 | 7,843 | 8,086 | 11,105 | 11,093 | 13,739 | 16,099 | 20,297 |
| MA | $1.1 \%$ | 8,446 | 5,949 | 5,540 | 6,291 | 6,191 | 10,006 | 12,702 | 12,847 |
| MI | $2.4 \%$ | 27,008 | 16,914 | 18,153 | 22,223 | 25,106 | 33,248 | 37,570 | 40,591 |
| MN | $9.0 \%$ | 59,128 | 34,860 | 28,225 | 49,369 | 52,048 | 54,780 | 53,583 | 60,926 |
| MS | $4.4 \%$ | 12,939 | 7,915 | 8,487 | 12,557 | 14,378 | 17,937 | 18,845 | 20,676 |

Figure 20 Uniqueness of \{ZIP, Gender, Month and year of birth\} respecting age distribution, part 1

Of the ZIP codes reported in Figure 22, about half ( 13,871 of 29,212 or $47 \%$ ) have sufficient numbers of people in each age subdivision so that values of $Q I_{S I D 1}=\{$ month and year of birth, gender, 5-digit ZIP\} are not likely to be uniquely identifying; in these cases, \%pop identifiable $=0$. Values of $Q I_{\text {SID1 }}$ for about one third (9103 of 29212 or 31\%) of the ZIP codes are considered uniquely identifying in all age subdivisions; in these cases, $\%$ pop identifiable $=1$. The remaining ZIP codes ( 6238 of 29212 or $21 \%$ ) have sub-populations in which values of $Q I_{\text {SID } 1}$ are uniquely identifiable for some age subdivisions but not for others.

Figure 23 provides statistical highlights from the plot in Figure 22. The topmost table provides statistics on ZIP codes in which the number of people within the noted age subdivision is less than or equal to the threshold for that subdivision. In these cases, the sub-population within the ZIP code is considered uniquely identifiable; that is, $\%$ pop_Identifiable $=1$ for that age subdivision and ZIP code. The bottom table provides statistics in cases where \%pop_Identifiable $<1$. In these ZIP codes, the number of people within the noted age subdivision is greater than the threshold for that subdivision; therefore, this subdivision is not considered uniquely identifiable. The method for computing these statistics was described earlier in the Methods section (on page 11).
L. Sweeney, Simple Demographics Often Identify People Uniquely. Carnegie Mellon University, Data Privacy Working Paper 3. Pittsburgh 2000.

|  | MonYr |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| State | \%ID_pop | AUnder12 | A12to18 | A19to24 | A25to34 | A35to44 | A45to54 | A55to64 | A65Plus |
| MO | 8.2\% | 65,966 | 37,847 | 31,629 | 52,566 | 53,596 | 57,098 | 56,566 | 65,194 |
| MT | 15.5\% | 18,771 | 11,741 | 7,717 | 16,581 | 16,326 | 16,280 | 16,432 | 19,924 |
| NE | 18.2\% | 46,646 | 27,556 | 17,763 | 38,678 | 40,574 | 34,699 | 37,697 | 43,232 |
| NV | 2.0\% | 4,320 | 2,035 | 1,983 | 3,341 | 2,977 | 2,516 | 2,705 | 4,256 |
| NH | 7.5\% | 11,934 | 7,545 | 6,001 | 8,773 | 7,859 | 12,067 | 13,156 | 15,851 |
| NJ | 0.6\% | 6,760 | 4,693 | 3,510 | 3,811 | 4,642 | 5,846 | 8,238 | 8,142 |
| NM | 5.2\% | 11,169 | 6,307 | 5,208 | 10,048 | 10,235 | 10,844 | 11,340 | 14,141 |
| NY | 2.3\% | 54,792 | 33,243 | 31,443 | 45,160 | 49,560 | 61,882 | 68,223 | 76,979 |
| NC | 2.4\% | 22,064 | 11,906 | 10,595 | 17,177 | 16,987 | 23,559 | 27,726 | 31,714 |
| ND | 26.5\% | 28,362 | 16,090 | 9,492 | 22,535 | 22,563 | 20,666 | 22,226 | 27,314 |
| OH | 2.2\% | 28,645 | 14,449 | 18,930 | 24,301 | 24,283 | 37,395 | 43,814 | 47,838 |
| OK | 7.1\% | 32,749 | 20,178 | 16,901 | 26,174 | 29,484 | 29,507 | 32,320 | 35,238 |
| OR | 4.2\% | 18,614 | 9,286 | 8,839 | 15,741 | 14,495 | 15,766 | 15,778 | 19,684 |
| PA | 3.5\% | 58,144 | 32,516 | 32,758 | 47,305 | 45,996 | 62,507 | 66,894 | 75,584 |
| RI | 0.9\% | 1,085 | 642 | 500 | 764 | 1,417 | 1,025 | 1,487 | 1,996 |
| SC | 2.3\% | 9,342 | 5,171 | 5,813 | 8,643 | 8,309 | 12,372 | 13,670 | 16,738 |
| SD | 25.9\% | 27,699 | 17,147 | 11,054 | 25,496 | 24,375 | 22,171 | 23,721 | 28,405 |
| TN | 3.4\% | 24,172 | 12,553 | 13,053 | 18,105 | 19,074 | 22,832 | 25,898 | 30,553 |
| TX | 2.3\% | 51,615 | 29,794 | 30,883 | 45,082 | 50,060 | 58,173 | 62,784 | 68,838 |
| UT | 3.4\% | 8,496 | 4,844 | 4,042 | 7,026 | 7,447 | 8,832 | 8,293 | 10,307 |
| VT | 21.9\% | 19,797 | 11,196 | 8,334 | 16,536 | 17,312 | 16,075 | 16,093 | 18,066 |
| VA | 4.4\% | 41,345 | 23,241 | 20,634 | 30,706 | 33,035 | 35,263 | 40,117 | 47,007 |
| WA | 2.6\% | 18,736 | 11,083 | 9,104 | 14,925 | 15,043 | 17,563 | 19,665 | 21,650 |
| WV | 15.5\% | 43,535 | 25,866 | 21,381 | 36,753 | 37,676 | 34,584 | 35,731 | 42,582 |
| WI | 5.4\% | 32,406 | 21,664 | 21,855 | 31,257 | 30,297 | 40,576 | 43,567 | 44,714 |
| WY | 10.1\% | 8,492 | 3,943 | 2,743 | 6,058 | 5,943 | 6,251 | 5,893 | 6,684 |
| USA | 3.7\% | 1,329,747 | 759,051 | 676,728 | 1,098,342 | 1,125,947 | 1,269,289 | 1,351,139 | 1,529,041 |
| \%ID_pop |  | 3.1\% | 3.2\% | 3.0\% | 2.5\% | 3.0\% | 5.0\% | 6.4\% | 4.9\% |

Figure 21 Uniqueness of $\{Z I P$, Gender, Month and year of birth\} respecting age distribution, part 2


Figure 22 Percentage of Population Identifiable Based on Uniform Distribution of Ages in ZIP Population

The values reported as ZIP populations in Figure 22 are not the total number of people within the reported age subdivision residing in those ZIP codes but are just the numbers of people
L. Sweeney, Simple Demographics Often Identify People Uniquely. Carnegie Mellon University, Data Privacy Working Paper 3. Pittsburgh 2000.
residing in the ZIP code. For example, consider the values appearing in the "Aunder12" column in Figure 22. They report information about children under the age of 12 residing in 10,852 ZIP codes in the United States that had insufficient numbers of children to render corresponding values of $Q I_{\text {SID } 1}=\{$ month and year of birth, gender, 5-digit ZIP\} uniquely identifiable. Of these ZIP codes, the largest number of children of under the age of 12, residing in a ZIP code was 287. Some ZIP codes, who had people residing within them, had no children in this age. The average number of children in these ZIP codes was 123 with a standard deviation of 80 .

Sub-population considered uniquely identifiable (<= threshold, IDSet)

|  | AUnder12 | A12to18 | A19to24 | A25to34 | A35to44 | A45to54 | A55to64 | A65Plus |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Max ZIP sub-population | 287 | 167 | 143 | 239 | 239 | 239 | 239 | 287 |
| Min ZIP sub-population | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Average ZIP sub-population | 123 | 71 | 53 | 101 | 102 | 96 | 95 | 118 |
| standard deviation | 80 | 47 | 40 | 66 | 66 | 66 | 66 | 80 |
| Number of ZIP codes | 10852 | 10725 | 12760 | 10883 | 11045 | 13202 | 14220 | 12905 |
| Percentage ZIP codes | $37.1 \%$ | $36.7 \%$ | $43.7 \%$ | $37.3 \%$ | $37.8 \%$ | $45.2 \%$ | $48.7 \%$ | $44.2 \%$ |

Sub-population NOT considered uniquely identifiable (> threshold, NotIDSet)

| AUnder12 | A12to18 | A19to24 | A25to34 | A35to44 | A45to54 | A55to64 | A65Plus |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 26914 | 15352 | 27123 | 24587 | 19543 | 15544 | 12205 | 25799 |
| 288 | 168 | 144 | 240 | 240 | 240 | 240 | 288 |
| 2294 | 1241 | 1333 | 2309 | 2007 | 1509 | 1316 | 1815 |
| 2530 | 1327 | 1690 | 2632 | 2096 | 1419 | 1174 | 1860 |
| 18360 | 18487 | 16452 | 18329 | 18167 | 16010 | 14992 | 16307 |
| $62.9 \%$ | $63.3 \%$ | $56.3 \%$ | $62.7 \%$ | $62.2 \%$ | $54.8 \%$ | $51.3 \%$ | $55.8 \%$ |

Figure 23 Statistical highlights from Figure 20 and Figure 21

### 5.3. Experiment D: Uniqueness of \{ZIP, gender, age\}

In this experiment, I examine the identifiability of \{year of birth, gender, 5-digit ZIP\} in the United States. Progressing through the results from the last three experiments, values referring to age became less specific and as expected, the values became less uniquely identifying. What may be surprising however is that these values remained uniquely identifying for some people.

The Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality's State Inpatient Database (SID; see Figure 3) motivated this experiment as well as experiment C. In addition to $Q I_{\text {SID } 1}$ used in experiment C, SID also includes $Q I_{\text {SID } 2}=\{$ age, gender, 5 -digit ZIP $\}$ for some states in those data. Recall in section 4.4.1, I examine age as providing a distinct year of birth, and so $Q I_{\text {SID2 }}=\{$ age, gender, 5-digit ZIP $\}$ can be considered as $Q I_{\text {SID2 }}=\{$ year of birth, gender, 5 -digit ZIP $\}$.

### 5.3.1. Experiment D Design

Step 1. Use ZIP table for each of the 50 states and the District of Columbia. Step 2. Figure 24 contains the thresholds for $Q=\{$ gender, date of birth $\}$ specific to each age subdivision. Step 3. Report statistical measurements computed from the table in step 1 using the thresholds determined in step 2. Figure 25 and Figure 26 report the results.
L. Sweeney, Simple Demographics Often Identify People Uniquely. Carnegie Mellon University, Data Privacy Working Paper 3. Pittsburgh 2000.

| Q4 = \{gender, year of birth $\}$ |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| \|Q4 AUnderl2 $^{\text {2 }}$ | $=2 * 12$ | $=24$ |
| \|Q4 $4_{\text {A12to18 }}{ }^{\text {a }}$ | $=2$ * 7 | $=14$ |
|  | $=2 * 6$ | = 12 |
| $\mid \mathrm{Q} 4_{\text {A256034 }}{ }^{\text {a }}$ | $=2$ * 10 | $=20$ |
| $\mid \mathrm{Q} 4_{\text {A35to44 }}{ }^{\text {a }}$ | $=2 * 10$ | $=20$ |
| $\mid \mathrm{Q} 4_{\text {A45t054\| }}{ }^{\text {a }}$ | $=2$ * 10 | $=20$ |
| $\mid \mathrm{Q} 4_{\text {a } 55064 \mid}$ | $=2 * 10$ | $=20$ |
| \|Q4 $4_{\text {a65Plus }}$ \| | $=2 * 12$ | $=24$ |

Figure 24 Number of possible values for each age subdivision for \{gender, year of birth\}

### 5.3.2. Experiment D Results

Figure 25 and Figure 26 show the results of applying the 3 steps of experiment $D$ to each state, the District of Columbia (as just reported) and the entire United States. The percentage of people residing in each locale likely to be uniquely identifiable based on \{gender, year of birth, ZIP\} appears in the column named "BirthYr \%ID_pop" and the number of people represented by the percentage appears in the column named "BirthYr \#ID_pop". For example, 0.89\% (or 5703 people) of the population of Iowa (see Figure 26) are likely to be uniquely identifiable by values of $\{$ gender, year of birth, ZIP\}.

| State | $\begin{aligned} & \text { BirthYr } \\ & \text { \%ID_pop } \end{aligned}$ | BirthYr Total | AUnder12 | A12to18 | A19to24 | A25to34 | A35to44 | A45to54 | A55to64 | A65Plus |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| AL | 0.02\% | 918 | 105 | 53 | 89 | 97 | 112 | 125 | 158 | 179 |
| AK | 0.70\% | 3,809 | 227 | 223 | 227 | 223 | 315 | 631 | 804 | 1,159 |
| AZ | 0.02\% | 638 | 68 | 31 | 23 | 53 | 98 | 98 | 96 | 171 |
| AR | 0.09\% | 2,121 | 452 | 138 | 264 | 208 | 248 | 312 | 349 | 150 |
| CA | 0.01\% | 4,229 | 541 | 319 | 362 | 461 | 336 | 540 | 678 | 992 |
| CO | 0.08\% | 2,752 | 287 | 224 | 346 | 336 | 201 | 447 | 426 | 485 |
| CT | 0.01\% | 474 | 69 | 55 | 36 | 52 | 30 | 108 | 63 | 61 |
| DE | 0.02\% | 158 | 18 | 13 | 21 | 28 | 36 | 5 | 10 | 27 |
| DC | 0.01\% | 46 | 6 | - | - | - | - | - | 16 | 24 |
| FL | 0.00\% | 512 | 76 | 63 | 9 | 5 | 43 | 90 | 121 | 105 |
| GA | 0.01\% | 780 | 83 | 29 | 91 | 101 | 56 | 120 | 182 | 118 |
| HI | 0.01\% | 165 | 28 | 11 | 9 | 33 | 42 | 12 | 20 | 10 |
| ID | 0.19\% | 1,943 | 259 | 148 | 205 | 255 | 258 | 310 | 248 | 260 |
| IL | 0.01\% | 1,401 | 167 | 111 | 148 | 141 | 123 | 246 | 255 | 210 |
| IN | 0.01\% | 746 | 82 | 27 | 54 | 88 | 84 | 89 | 131 | 191 |
| IA | 0.11\% | 3,106 | 278 | 305 | 647 | 182 | 249 | 583 | 535 | 327 |
| KS | 0.22\% | 5,482 | 575 | 446 | 924 | 571 | 594 | 1,017 | 750 | 605 |
| KY | 0.13\% | 4,722 | 671 | 309 | 280 | 528 | 448 | 697 | 966 | 823 |
| LA | 0.02\% | 870 | 118 | 48 | 75 | 118 | 84 | 135 | 169 | 123 |
| ME | 0.19\% | 2,296 | 293 | 217 | 190 | 287 | 228 | 280 | 331 | 470 |
| MD | 0.03\% | 1,275 | 152 | 119 | 96 | 156 | 179 | 187 | 194 | 192 |
| MA | 0.01\% | 499 | 83 | 50 | 51 | 35 | 25 | 58 | 100 | 97 |
| MI | 0.01\% | 920 | 124 | 133 | 134 | 151 | 71 | 133 | 120 | 54 |
| MN | 0.06\% | 2,709 | 365 | 214 | 439 | 421 | 265 | 326 | 335 | 344 |
| MS | 0.02\% | 462 | 54 | 23 | 21 | 39 | 26 | 57 | 136 | 106 |

Figure 25 Uniqueness of \{ZIP, Gender, Year of birth\} respecting age distribution, part 1

The next to last row in Figure 26 labeled "USA" reports the results of applying the 3 steps of experiment D to all ZIP codes in the United States. As shown, $0.04 \%$ (or 105,016 people) of the population of the United States is likely to be uniquely identified by values of \{gender, year of birth, ZIP\}. The last row in Figure 26 labeled "\%ID_pop" displays the percentage of people in each age subdivision who are likely to be uniquely identified by values of \{gender, year of birth, ZIP\}. For example, it reports that $0.08 \%$ of the population of persons residing in the
L. Sweeney, Simple Demographics Often Identify People Uniquely. Carnegie Mellon University, Data Privacy Working Paper 3. Pittsburgh 2000.

United States between the ages of 55 and 64 are likely to be uniquely identified by values of \{gender, year of birth, ZIP\}.

| State | $\begin{gathered} \text { BirthYr } \\ \text { \%ID_pop } \end{gathered}$ | BirthYr Total | AUnder12 | A12to18 | A19to24 | A25to34 | A35to44 | A45to54 | A55to64 | A65Plus |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| MO | 0.07\% | 3,403 | 451 | 320 | 402 | 312 | 371 | 549 | 531 | 467 |
| MT | 0.43\% | 3,465 | 399 | 263 | 405 | 433 | 362 | 534 | 492 | 577 |
| NE | 0.23\% | 3,560 | 241 | 241 | 717 | 325 | 387 | 676 | 455 | 518 |
| NV | 0.04\% | 439 | 77 | 35 | 39 | 47 | 47 | 62 | 57 | 75 |
| NH | 0.07\% | 777 | 154 | 62 | 106 | 56 | 81 | 111 | 100 | 107 |
| NJ | 0.01\% | 728 | 125 | 62 | 41 | 61 | 51 | 96 | 114 | 178 |
| NM | 0.22\% | 3,302 | 343 | 276 | 237 | 395 | 350 | 569 | 644 | 488 |
| NY | 0.03\% | 5,460 | 714 | 469 | 533 | 720 | 445 | 804 | 818 | 957 |
| NC | 0.02\% | 1,032 | 133 | 94 | 74 | 134 | 103 | 177 | 168 | 149 |
| ND | 0.89\% | 5,703 | 586 | 476 | 832 | 675 | 639 | 932 | 787 | 776 |
| OH | 0.00\% | 377 | 34 | 25 | 30 | 37 | 33 | 38 | 96 | 84 |
| OK | 0.06\% | 1,963 | 220 | 135 | 248 | 219 | 274 | 336 | 237 | 294 |
| OR | 0.07\% | 1,900 | 369 | 140 | 172 | 258 | 124 | 214 | 315 | 308 |
| PA | 0.03\% | 3,099 | 501 | 201 | 324 | 413 | 348 | 429 | 440 | 443 |
| RI | 0.01\% | 92 | - | - | - | 9 | 10 | 30 | 19 | 24 |
| SC | 0.01\% | 443 | 87 | 16 | 41 | 66 | 63 | 85 | 45 | 40 |
| SD | 0.63\% | 4,408 | 489 | 291 | 607 | 544 | 516 | 632 | 597 | 732 |
| TN | 0.02\% | 836 | 201 | 14 | 125 | 70 | 53 | 165 | 128 | 80 |
| TX | 0.03\% | 5,483 | 815 | 383 | 443 | 641 | 661 | 717 | 794 | 1,029 |
| UT | 0.08\% | 1,323 | 78 | 59 | 146 | 189 | 151 | 230 | 230 | 240 |
| VT | 0.20\% | 1,117 | 76 | 63 | 171 | 54 | 81 | 166 | 150 | 356 |
| VA | 0.06\% | 3,754 | 572 | 286 | 350 | 423 | 445 | 483 | 638 | 557 |
| WA | 0.03\% | 1,227 | 164 | 85 | 145 | 138 | 122 | 142 | 220 | 211 |
| WV | 0.30\% | 5,360 | 746 | 316 | 433 | 614 | 605 | 874 | 869 | 903 |
| WI | 0.02\% | 881 | 80 | 101 | 135 | 130 | 79 | 103 | 103 | 150 |
| WY | 0.41\% | 1,851 | 213 | 157 | 232 | 165 | 195 | 361 | 223 | 305 |
| USA | 0.04\% | 105,016 | 13,049 | 7,879 | 11,729 | 11,697 | 10,747 | 16,121 | 16,463 | 17,331 |
| \%ID_pop |  |  | 0.03\% | 0.03\% | 0.05\% | 0.03\% | 0.03\% | 0.06\% | 0.08\% | 0.06\% |

Figure 26 Uniqueness of \{ZIP, Gender, Year of birth\} respecting age distribution, part 2
Most ZIP codes (25,705 of 29,212 or 88\%) have sufficient numbers of people in each age subdivision so that values of $Q I_{\text {SID2 }}=$ \{year of birth, gender, 5-digit ZIP\} are not likely to be uniquely identifying; in these cases, $\%$ pop identifiable $=0$. Values of $Q I_{S I D 2}$ for about one third (353 of 29212 or $1 \%$ ) of the ZIP codes are considered uniquely identifying in all age subdivisions; in these cases, \%pop identifiable $=1$. The remaining ZIP codes (3154 of 29212 or $11 \%$ ) have sub-populations in which values of $Q I_{\text {SID2 }}$ are uniquely identifiable for some age subdivisions but not for all.

Figure 27 provides statistical highlights. The topmost table provides statistics on ZIP codes in which the number of people within the noted age subdivision is less than or equal to the threshold for that subdivision. In these cases, the sub-population within the ZIP code is considered uniquely identifiable; that is, \%pop_Identifiable = 1 for that age subdivision and ZIP code. The bottom table provides statistics in cases where \%pop_Identifiable < 1. In these ZIP codes, the number of people within the noted age subdivision is greater than the threshold for that subdivision; therefore, this subdivision is not considered uniquely identifiable.
L. Sweeney, Simple Demographics Often Identify People Uniquely. Carnegie Mellon University, Data Privacy Working Paper 3. Pittsburgh 2000.

## Sub-population considered uniquely identifiable (<= threshold, IDSet)

|  | AUnder12 | A12to18 | A19to24 | A25to34 | A35to44 | A45to54 | A55to64 | A65Plus |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Max ZIP sub-population | 24 | 14 | 12 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 24 |
| Min ZIP sub-population | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Average ZIP sub-population | 11 | 6 | 5 | 10 | 9 | 10 | 9 | 11 |
| standard deviation | 8 | 5 | 4 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 8 |
| Number of ZIP codes | 1200 | 1342 | 2309 | 1210 | 1150 | 1651 | 1798 | 1584 |
| Percentage ZIP codes | $4.1 \%$ | $4.6 \%$ | $7.9 \%$ | $4.1 \%$ | $3.9 \%$ | $5.7 \%$ | $6.2 \%$ | $5.4 \%$ |

Sub-population NOT considered uniquely identifiable (> threshold, NotIDSet)

|  | AUnder12 | A12to18 | A19to24 | A25to34 | A35to44 | A45to54 | A55to64 | A65Plus |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Max ZIP sub-population | 26914 | 15352 | 27123 | 24587 | 19543 | 15544 | 12205 | 25799 |
| Min ZIP sub-population | 25 | 15 | 13 | 21 | 21 | 21 | 21 | 25 |
| Average ZIP sub-population | 1551 | 850 | 840 | 1551 | 1339 | 922 | 768 | 1126 |
| standard deviation | 2291 | 1212 | 1460 | 2372 | 1914 | 1284 | 1057 | 1652 |
| Number of ZIP codes | 28012 | 27870 | 26903 | 28002 | 28062 | 27561 | 27414 | 27628 |
| Percentage ZIP codes | $95.9 \%$ | $95.4 \%$ | $92.1 \%$ | $95.9 \%$ | $96.1 \%$ | $94.3 \%$ | $93.8 \%$ | $94.6 \%$ |

Figure 27 Statistical highlights from Figure 25 and Figure 26

### 5.4. Experiment F: Uniqueness of \{place/city, gender, date of birth\}

This experiment examines the identifiability of \{date of birth, gender, place\}. While the number of places is expected to be less than the number of ZIP codes, the difference is not as dramatic as one would expect.

|  | DOB |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| State | \%ID_pop | AUnder12 | A12to18 | A19to24 | A25to34 | A35to44 | A45to54 | A55to64 | A65Plus |
| AL | $74.31 \%$ | 510,294 | 316,271 | 246,921 | 455,646 | 425,871 | 340,085 | 290,787 | 416,713 |
| AK | $67.62 \%$ | 86,943 | 36,668 | 30,801 | 72,365 | 66,328 | 34,744 | 18,336 | 22,157 |
| AZ | $30.18 \%$ | 207,821 | 117,371 | 79,857 | 154,789 | 150,173 | 121,318 | 116,660 | 158,254 |
| AR | $85.73 \%$ | 355,634 | 221,013 | 144,471 | 278,355 | 286,099 | 217,119 | 197,637 | 314,833 |
| CA | $35.99 \%$ | $1,705,016$ | $1,032,675$ | 785,915 | $1,266,384$ | $1,411,260$ | $1,494,618$ | $1,350,466$ | $1,663,710$ |
| CO | $40.41 \%$ | 221,248 | 124,459 | 100,826 | 189,908 | 196,192 | 164,375 | 145,456 | 188,554 |
| CT | $66.44 \%$ | 355,973 | 208,871 | 144,966 | 296,959 | 320,087 | 299,897 | 249,481 | 307,714 |
| DE | $68.04 \%$ | 78,966 | 40,675 | 32,116 | 63,018 | 69,766 | 49,625 | 52,013 | 67,054 |
| DC | $0.00 \%$ | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |  |
| FL | $44.12 \%$ | 866,146 | 523,124 | 416,970 | 743,419 | 783,719 | 697,379 | 690,365 | 875,685 |
| GA | $62.62 \%$ | 737,096 | 425,884 | 331,861 | 601,348 | 569,614 | 501,763 | 393,910 | 495,444 |
| HI | $49.94 \%$ | 89,975 | 69,406 | 41,139 | 80,566 | 82,216 | 68,636 | 55,413 | 66,056 |
| ID | $76.93 \%$ | 147,599 | 93,691 | 50,482 | 116,729 | 113,067 | 83,114 | 66,524 | 103,285 |
| IL | $60.16 \%$ | $1,205,138$ | 698,921 | 490,199 | 976,815 | 965,017 | 842,088 | 731,266 | 966,748 |
| IN | $63.45 \%$ | 610,004 | 362,468 | 272,124 | 485,926 | 499,979 | 431,504 | 366,413 | 488,978 |
| IA | $77.50 \%$ | 375,417 | 218,025 | 141,276 | 310,173 | 302,724 | 238,696 | 219,669 | 345,691 |
| KS | $66.77 \%$ | 295,043 | 167,547 | 111,512 | 236,104 | 229,189 | 182,750 | 160,132 | 270,086 |
| KY | $78.76 \%$ | 513,045 | 319,232 | 234,139 | 451,331 | 419,197 | 325,073 | 277,950 | 369,257 |
| LA | $58.86 \%$ | 474,999 | 271,968 | 196,903 | 380,395 | 336,651 | 278,656 | 233,811 | 310,514 |
| ME | $94.22 \%$ | 201,167 | 117,015 | 82,913 | 184,342 | 184,857 | 123,745 | 108,198 | 153,502 |
| MD | $63.22 \%$ | 542,516 | 299,174 | 256,363 | 432,696 | 456,506 | 379,792 | 307,456 | 341,639 |
| MA | $73.33 \%$ | 738,432 | 409,915 | 351,483 | 610,144 | 673,586 | 526,058 | 440,426 | 658,804 |
| MI | $56.68 \%$ | 912,385 | 535,570 | 393,345 | 760,515 | 737,677 | 656,494 | 551,937 | 720,202 |
| MN | $71.55 \%$ | 582,951 | 327,576 | 213,712 | 462,644 | 439,233 | 358,955 | 299,529 | 442,243 |
| MS | $81.12 \%$ | 386,515 | 232,392 | 164,750 | 307,447 | 278,994 | 231,718 | 197,189 | 288,516 |

Figure 28 Uniqueness of \{Place, Gender, Date of birth\} respecting age distribution, part 1

Step 1. Use ZIP table for each of the 50 states and the District of Columbia. Step 2. Figure 12 contains the thresholds for $Q=\{$ gender, date of birth specific to each age subdivision. Step 3. Report statistical measurements computed from the table in step 1 using the thresholds
L. Sweeney, Simple Demographics Often Identify People Uniquely. Carnegie Mellon University, Data Privacy Working Paper 3. Pittsburgh 2000.
determined in step 2. Figure 28 and Figure 29 report the results of applying the 3 steps of experiment F to each state, the District of Columbia and the entire United States.

The percentage of people residing in each locale likely to be uniquely identifiable by values of \{gender, date of birth, place\} appear in the column named "DOB \%ID_pop." For example, $94.22 \%$ of the population of Maine (see Figure 28) and $74.99 \%$ of the population of Pennsylvania (see Figure 29) are likely to be uniquely identifiable by values of \{gender, date of birth, place $\}$. Vermont had the largest percentage of its population identifiable ( $98.12 \%$ ). The District of Columbia had 0\% identified. The state having the smallest percentage was Nevada with $26.48 \%$. The average was $64.54 \%$ and the standard deviation was $17.88 \%$.

|  | DOB |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| State | \%ID_pop | AUnder12 | A12to18 | A19to24 | A25to34 | A35to44 | A45to54 | A55to64 | A65Plus |
| MO | 65.98\% | 575,534 | 345,340 | 253,443 | 490,825 | 454,370 | 395,626 | 347,346 | 509,243 |
| MT | 78.05\% | 111,323 | 63,624 | 30,390 | 86,536 | 94,856 | 73,526 | 67,930 | 95,497 |
| NE | 60.86\% | 173,370 | 100,557 | 63,607 | 137,330 | 136,238 | 98,945 | 92,145 | 157,885 |
| NV | 26.48\% | 48,890 | 29,379 | 17,274 | 44,040 | 48,251 | 49,077 | 36,910 | 44,428 |
| NH | 83.26\% | 164,556 | 84,043 | 75,108 | 158,945 | 156,196 | 94,268 | 79,579 | 110,913 |
| NJ | 75.46\% | 916,586 | 513,909 | 459,760 | 887,738 | 910,504 | 705,604 | 615,918 | 823,232 |
| NM | 58.82\% | 185,741 | 103,241 | 70,980 | 125,794 | 127,320 | 94,373 | 78,403 | 105,250 |
| NY | 50.89\% | 1,510,307 | 893,370 | 734,124 | 1,331,293 | 1,394,790 | 1,103,058 | 955,471 | 1,231,836 |
| NC | 66.99\% | 748,655 | 434,802 | 352,507 | 670,230 | 637,726 | 523,682 | 455,492 | 617,381 |
| ND | 89.24\% | 108,831 | 59,803 | 33,455 | 83,627 | 83,251 | 56,215 | 53,132 | 90,771 |
| OH | 65.65\% | 1,218,515 | 726,779 | 536,583 | 1,009,900 | 1,059,754 | 865,805 | 737,419 | 965,782 |
| OK | 64.24\% | 349,375 | 209,852 | 141,980 | 280,350 | 266,557 | 233,933 | 212,063 | 326,461 |
| OR | 64.29\% | 318,531 | 186,694 | 120,253 | 251,227 | 266,919 | 224,214 | 180,088 | 279,439 |
| PA | 74.99\% | 1,427,475 | 829,811 | 674,412 | 1,324,556 | 1,288,682 | 1,002,535 | 960,527 | 1,401,861 |
| RI | 55.57\% | 83,379 | 52,128 | 46,137 | 74,615 | 83,775 | 73,597 | 65,732 | 78,157 |
| SC | 67.65\% | 404,179 | 259,598 | 178,853 | 347,400 | 357,955 | 263,798 | 240,827 | 306,073 |
| SD | 81.02\% | 108,221 | 62,338 | 36,113 | 80,508 | 80,733 | 53,059 | 51,721 | 90,508 |
| TN | 64.98\% | 529,152 | 319,932 | 243,251 | 474,021 | 459,452 | 388,946 | 320,903 | 433,014 |
| TX | 44.27\% | 1,410,090 | 792,176 | 561,715 | 1,100,437 | 1,053,590 | 840,761 | 735,749 | 1,025,466 |
| UT | 56.43\% | 208,964 | 117,137 | 81,156 | 132,730 | 134,699 | 106,448 | 84,198 | 106,867 |
| VT | 98.12\% | 99,365 | 53,099 | 42,494 | 95,880 | 92,804 | 57,274 | 45,118 | 66,169 |
| VA | 58.50\% | 588,706 | 358,361 | 294,519 | 565,454 | 531,480 | 468,056 | 357,966 | 453,394 |
| WA | 53.56\% | 458,232 | 257,086 | 168,811 | 372,536 | 382,178 | 319,725 | 272,740 | 375,511 |
| WV | 90.95\% | 260,338 | 178,947 | 125,468 | 232,443 | 242,711 | 184,384 | 169,168 | 237,233 |
| WI | 68.27\% | 584,155 | 333,763 | 235,969 | 497,263 | 483,528 | 372,939 | 334,139 | 497,585 |
| WY | 79.05\% | 67,039 | 36,679 | 20,714 | 52,859 | 53,145 | 45,541 | 35,539 | 47,045 |
| USA | 58.38\% | 24,859,832 | 14,572,359 | 10,914,146 | 20,826,555 | 20,879,466 | 17,343,591 | 15,107,247 | 20,512,640 |
| \%ID_pop |  | 57.2\% | 61.5\% | 48.3\% | 48.0\% | 55.6\% | 68.2\% | 71.7\% | 65.9\% |

Figure 29 Uniqueness of \{Place, Gender, Date of birth\} respecting age distribution, part 2

The next to last row in Figure 29 labeled "USA" reports the results of applying the 3 steps of experiment F to all places in the United States. As shown, $58.38 \%$ of the population of the United States is likely to be uniquely identified by values of \{gender, date of birth, place\}. The last row in Figure 29 labeled "\%ID_pop" displays the percentage of people in each age subdivision who are likely to be uniquely identified by values of \{gender, date of birth, place\}. For example, it reports that $71.7 \%$ of the population of persons residing in the United States between the ages of 55 and 64 are likely to be uniquely identifiable based on \{gender, date of birth, place\}.

The place having the largest population was Chicago, Illinois, with $2,451,767$ people. The place having the smallest population was Crooked Creek, Alaska that reports only one person of age 65 or more resides there. The average population for a place is 9,710 and the standard deviation is 44,149 . There are a total of 25,585 places.
L. Sweeney, Simple Demographics Often Identify People Uniquely. Carnegie Mellon University, Data Privacy Working Paper 3. Pittsburgh 2000.

### 5.5. Experiment J: Uniqueness of \{county, gender, date of birth\}

This experiment examines the identifiability of \{date of birth, gender, county\}. Recall, there are a total of 29,343 ZIP codes, 25,688 places and 3,141 counties.

Step 1. Use ZIP table for each of the 50 states and the District of Columbia. Step 2. Figure 12 contains the thresholds for $Q=\{$ gender, date of birth $\}$ specific to each age subdivision. Step 3. Report statistical measurements computed from the table in step 1 using the thresholds determined in step 2. Figure 30 and Figure 31 report the results of applying the 3 steps of experiment J to each state, the District of Columbia and the entire United States.

The percentage of people residing in each locale likely to be uniquely identifiable by values of \{gender, date of birth, county\} appear in the column named "DOB \%ID_pop." For example, $58 \%$ of the population of Mississippi (see Figure 30) and $52 \%$ of the population of Nebraska (see Figure 31) are likely to be uniquely identifiable by values of \{gender, date of birth, county\}. Wyoming had the largest percentage of its population identifiable (75\%). Connecticut, Delaware, the District of Columbia and New Jersey had 0\% identified. The average was $28 \%$ and the standard deviation was $22 \%$.

The next to last row in Figure 31 labeled "USA" reports the results of applying the 3 steps of experiment J to all counties in the United States. As shown, $18.1 \%$ of the population of the United States is likely to be uniquely identified by values of \{gender, date of birth, county\}. The last row in Figure 31 labeled "\%ID_pop" displays the percentage of people in each age subdivision who are likely to be uniquely identified by values of \{gender, date of birth, county\}. For example, it reports that $25.84 \%$ of the population of persons residing in the United States between the ages of 55 and 64 are likely to be uniquely identifiable based on \{gender, date of birth, county\}.

| State | $\begin{array}{r} \text { DOB } \\ \text { \%ID_pop } \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { DOB } \\ & \text { Total } \end{aligned}$ | AUnder12 | A12to18 | A19to24 | A25to34 | A35to44 | A45to54 | A55to64 | A65Plus |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| AL | 31\% | 1,239,261 | 203,418 | 119,887 | 100,859 | 147,718 | 149,568 | 145,639 | 165,943 | 206,229 |
| AK | 43\% | 231,537 | 39,695 | 25,282 | 18,424 | 47,769 | 29,382 | 31,533 | 17,293 | 22,159 |
| AZ | 5\% | 168,352 | 23,995 | 13,659 | 8,351 | 15,873 | 23,248 | 23,557 | 26,589 | 33,080 |
| AR | 55\% | 1,286,703 | 204,611 | 126,862 | 85,675 | 165,982 | 171,952 | 153,203 | 149,635 | 228,783 |
| CA | 2\% | 482,182 | 74,362 | 42,716 | 33,536 | 62,826 | 50,565 | 61,321 | 70,890 | 85,966 |
| CO | 16\% | 530,181 | 94,650 | 50,001 | 38,332 | 85,809 | 86,915 | 60,219 | 46,794 | 67,461 |
| CT | 0\% | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| DE | 0\% | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| DC | 0\% | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| FL | 5\% | 680,438 | 109,084 | 74,526 | 59,719 | 96,106 | 93,589 | 80,169 | 64,489 | 102,756 |
| GA | 36\% | 2,335,158 | 385,475 | 236,121 | 182,875 | 311,416 | 297,509 | 294,860 | 257,992 | 368,910 |
| HI | 2\% | 24,302 | - | 4,985 | 3,356 | - | 20 | 5,039 | 4,127 | 6,775 |
| ID | 50\% | 504,176 | 84,045 | 54,338 | 27,716 | 64,270 | 70,098 | 61,874 | 63,762 | 78,073 |
| IL | 15\% | 1,733,651 | 294,307 | 164,151 | 119,585 | 237,212 | 225,134 | 210,334 | 189,098 | 293,830 |
| IN | 33\% | 1,805,518 | 310,118 | 183,259 | 129,393 | 268,623 | 228,630 | 204,738 | 205,590 | 275,167 |
| IA | 57\% | 1,574,848 | 267,585 | 153,138 | 102,462 | 208,798 | 216,811 | 168,181 | 161,950 | 295,923 |
| KS | 45\% | 1,117,968 | 187,792 | 105,602 | 71,548 | 150,530 | 142,864 | 128,522 | 120,241 | 210,869 |
| KY | 55\% | 2,015,672 | 339,649 | 199,166 | 162,837 | 287,814 | 264,521 | 239,055 | 215,956 | 306,674 |
| LA | 26\% | 1,103,759 | 166,000 | 99,616 | 76,791 | 129,159 | 151,255 | 132,897 | 154,279 | 193,762 |
| ME | 24\% | 289,549 | 45,914 | 25,233 | 25,821 | 33,214 | 34,481 | 37,839 | 34,151 | 52,896 |
| MD | 6\% | 288,043 | 36,084 | 19,602 | 20,508 | 36,667 | 32,605 | 29,983 | 51,224 | 61,370 |
| MA | 1\% | 30,080 | 2,997 | 1,179 | 914 | 2,739 | 3,651 | 8,515 | 7,345 | 2,740 |
| MI | 14\% | 1,270,356 | 187,954 | 101,271 | 84,202 | 147,645 | 144,700 | 167,106 | 186,504 | 250,974 |
| MN | 35\% | 1,545,738 | 264,233 | 169,559 | 98,392 | 209,122 | 217,857 | 169,995 | 152,615 | 263,965 |
| MS | 58\% | 1,503,027 | 258,287 | 160,447 | 109,981 | 202,539 | 185,987 | 179,021 | 161,836 | 244,929 |

Figure 30 Uniqueness of \{County, Gender, Date of birth\} respecting age distribution, part 1

The county having the largest population was Los Angeles County in California, with $8,863,164$ people. The county having the smallest population was Yellowstone County in
L. Sweeney, Simple Demographics Often Identify People Uniquely. Carnegie Mellon University, Data Privacy Working Paper 3. Pittsburgh 2000.

Montana where only 52 people reside. The average population for a county is 79,182 and the standard deviation is 263,813 . There are a total of 3,141 counties.

| State | $\begin{array}{r} \text { DOB } \\ \text { \%ID_pop } \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { DOB } \\ & \text { Total } \end{aligned}$ | AUnder12 | A12to18 | A19to24 | A25to34 | A35to44 | A45to54 | A55to64 | A65Plus |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| MO | 35\% | 1,777,250 | 299,822 | 177,231 | 117,495 | 235,542 | 226,741 | 199,449 | 201,418 | 319,552 |
| MT | 58\% | 461,847 | 79,868 | 50,920 | 26,385 | 52,524 | 57,155 | 54,121 | 58,303 | 82,571 |
| NE | 52\% | 827,590 | 148,680 | 81,858 | 48,439 | 114,003 | 115,534 | 80,505 | 86,132 | 152,439 |
| NV | 17\% | 205,707 | 39,060 | 19,336 | 13,922 | 34,721 | 32,791 | 23,853 | 18,433 | 23,591 |
| NH | 14\% | 158,917 | 18,460 | 14,248 | 10,218 | 17,034 | 17,684 | 29,898 | 27,505 | 23,870 |
| NJ | 0\% | 13,203 | - | 0 | - | - | - | 7,089 | 6,114 | - |
| NM | 31\% | 466,942 | 55,935 | 41,285 | 37,298 | 48,782 | 59,912 | 68,042 | 65,578 | 90,110 |
| NY | 4\% | 714,072 | 86,136 | 44,198 | 48,241 | 39,884 | 79,329 | 130,425 | 139,808 | 146,051 |
| NC | 26\% | 1,718,318 | 242,446 | 149,044 | 126,104 | 202,459 | 209,646 | 232,090 | 249,455 | 307,074 |
| ND | 63\% | 401,471 | 65,977 | 37,393 | 19,272 | 49,281 | 47,612 | 47,773 | 53,295 | 80,868 |
| OH | 14\% | 1,536,542 | 244,518 | 135,966 | 102,380 | 185,611 | 200,338 | 199,829 | 190,210 | 277,690 |
| OK | 44\% | 1,395,889 | 214,447 | 135,344 | 106,030 | 180,771 | 170,655 | 171,464 | 164,825 | 252,353 |
| OR | 16\% | 468,933 | 58,089 | 37,189 | 25,490 | 51,118 | 50,034 | 77,348 | 76,465 | 93,200 |
| PA | 7\% | 868,774 | 143,074 | 81,634 | 65,841 | 120,867 | 115,691 | 110,104 | 109,679 | 121,884 |
| RI | 4\% | 36,592 | 7,442 | 4,146 | - | - | 7,157 | 5,220 | 4,929 | 7,698 |
| SC | 23\% | 792,897 | 115,127 | 71,978 | 53,250 | 100,618 | 97,592 | 104,465 | 111,669 | 138,198 |
| SD | 73\% | 506,465 | 96,431 | 52,085 | 32,146 | 70,960 | 65,236 | 51,201 | 50,256 | 88,150 |
| TN | 37\% | 1,832,875 | 296,158 | 180,822 | 134,829 | 239,766 | 227,196 | 226,279 | 223,498 | 304,327 |
| TX | 19\% | 3,185,236 | 555,868 | 314,582 | 220,496 | 408,489 | 396,535 | 357,970 | 372,889 | 558,407 |
| UT | 17\% | 296,513 | 58,729 | 33,397 | 21,901 | 43,107 | 40,697 | 30,917 | 26,743 | 41,022 |
| VT | 59\% | 329,450 | 48,194 | 35,514 | 24,136 | 42,551 | 42,821 | 44,422 | 36,277 | 55,535 |
| VA | 35\% | 2,186,920 | 327,643 | 195,729 | 180,037 | 286,163 | 280,550 | 300,469 | 262,255 | 354,074 |
| WA | 11\% | 523,874 | 66,444 | 57,010 | 36,219 | 58,899 | 62,605 | 75,825 | 83,264 | 83,608 |
| WV | 59\% | 1,059,753 | 168,623 | 100,661 | 72,214 | 144,775 | 151,174 | 140,705 | 128,935 | 152,666 |
| WI | 25\% | 1,211,247 | 190,779 | 110,977 | 71,189 | 162,807 | 159,047 | 141,883 | 157,036 | 217,529 |
| WY | 75\% | 338,752 | 57,064 | 36,055 | 20,545 | 52,035 | 52,251 | 38,218 | 35,539 | 47,045 |
| USA | 18.1\% | 45,076,528 | 7,265,269 | 4,329,202 | 3,175,354 | 5,854,598 | 5,787,325 | 5,543,164 | 5,448,813 | 7,672,803 |
| \%ID_pop |  |  | 16.72\% | 18.27\% | 14.04\% | 13.48\% | 15.40\% | 21.79\% | 25.84\% | 24.65\% |

Figure 31 Uniqueness of \{County, Gender, Date of birth\} respecting age distribution, part 2

## 6. Discussion

Figure 32 contains a summary of the results reported in the previous section. A description of each reported percentage is provided in the following paragraphs. These percentages demonstrate how combinations of characteristics can combine to narrow the number of possible people under consideration as the subject of de-identified person-specific data.

| County | 18.1 | 0.04 | 0.00004 | $0.00000^{*}$ |
| ---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Place | 58.4 | 3.6 | 0.04 | 0.01 |
| ZIP | 87.1 | 3.7 | 0.04 | 0.01 |
|  | DOB | Mon/Year | BirthYear | 2yr Age |

Figure 32 Percentage of US population identified with gender as geography and age vary

Experiment B reported that $87.1 \%$ ( 216 million of 248 million) of the population in the United States had characteristics that were likely made them unique based only on \{5-digit ZIP, gender, date of birth\}. Experiment C reported that $3.7 \%$ of the population in the United States had characteristics that were likely made them unique based only on \{5-digit ZIP, gender, Month and year of birth\}. Experiment D reported that $0.04 \%$ of the population in the United States had characteristics that were likely made them unique based only on $\{5$-digit ZIP, gender, Year of birth\}. Experiment E reported that $0.01 \%$ of the population in the United States had characteristics that were likely made them unique based only on \{5-digit ZIP, gender, 2year age range\}.

Experiment F reported that $58.4 \%$ of the population in the United States had characteristics that were likely made them unique based only on \{Place, gender, date of birth\}. Experiment G reported that $3.6 \%$ of the population in the United States had characteristics that were likely made them unique based only on \{Place, gender, Month and year of birth\}. Experiment H reported that $0.04 \%$ of the population in the United States had characteristics that were likely made them unique based only on \{Place, gender, Year of birth\}. Experiment I reported that $0.01 \%$ of the population in the United States had characteristics that were likely made them unique based only on \{Place, gender, 2year age range\}.

Experiment J reported that $18.1 \%$ of the population in the United States had characteristics that were likely made them unique based only on \{County, gender, date of birth\}. Experiment K reported that $0.04 \%$ of the population in the United States had characteristics that were likely made them unique based only on \{County, gender, Month and year of birth\}. Experiment L reported that $0.00004 \%$ of the population in the United States had characteristics that were likely made them unique based only on \{County, gender, Year of birth\}. Experiment M reported that $0.00000 \%$ of the population in the United States had characteristics that were likely made them unique based only on \{County, gender, 2year age range\}, but despite it being a very small number, it is not 0 .*

As the number of possible values a quasi-identifier can assume decreases, the percentage of the population in the United States who had characteristics that were likely unique based on those values decreases. This is evidenced by each row in Figure 32. Moving from left to right within each row of Figure 32, the numbers of possible combinations decrease and the corresponding percentages decrease. Aggregating the geographical specification to county resulted in far fewer possible combinations than available with place or ZIP codes. This is evidenced within each column in Figure 32. Notice however that the differences between the number of places and the number of ZIP codes are not as dramatic, and as a result, neither are the corresponding percentages.

### 6.1. Predicting the number of people that can be identified in a release

It was already shown that de-identified releases of person-specific data that contain no explicit identifiers such as name, address or phone number, is not necessarily anonymous [16]. The maximum number of patients who could be identified in a public or semi-public release of health data is the number of patients who were hospitalized and whose information is therefore included in the data. Many possible combinations of attributes can combine to form a quasiidentifier useful for linking the de-identified data to explicitly identified data. The number of hospitalizations reported in the IHCCCC's $\mathrm{R}_{\text {rod }}$ data (see Figure 2) in one year is estimated to be 1 million based on the average statistic that 1:12 people are hospitalized each year.

However, the actual number of patients that could be re-identified in publicly and semipublicly released health data is not necessarily every patient and the actual number is likely to differ among releases due to varying quasi-identifiers available. The results from the experiments reported in this document can help predict a minimum level of identifiability based on a combination of three demographics.

[^0]
### 6.1.1. Illinois Research Health Data

As shown in Figure 2, $\mathrm{R}_{\text {rod }}$ includes the full date of birth, gender, and the patient's 5-digit residential ZIP. Figure 13 reports that $75.3 \%$ of the population of Illinois is likely to be uniquely identified by \{5-digit ZIP, gender, date of birth\}. That corresponds to 753,000 patients being identified per year in $\mathrm{R}_{\text {rod }}$.

### 6.1.2. AHRQ's State Inpatient Database

As shown in Figure 3, SID includes the month and year of birth, gender, and the patient's 5-digit residential ZIP for some states. Figure 33 estimates that 112,595 patients per year are likely to be uniquely identified by \{ZIP, Gender, Month and year of birth\} in SID. The five states known to report the month and year of the birth date of each patient to SID were introduced in Error! Reference source not found.. The populations for each of these states according to the 1990 Census data [17] were reported in Figure 8 and Figure 9. It is estimated that 1:12 people are hospitalized each year. These values are summarized in Figure 33.

| State | Population | Hospitalized | Unique | PopID |
| :---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| AZ | $3,665,228$ | 305,436 | $1.4 \%$ | 4,276 |
| IA | $2,776,442$ | 231,370 | $18.1 \%$ | 41,878 |
| NY | $17,990,026$ | $1,499,169$ | $2.3 \%$ | 34,481 |
| OR | $2,842,321$ | 236,860 | $4.2 \%$ | 9,948 |
| WI | $4,891,452$ | 407,621 | $5.4 \%$ | 22,012 |
|  |  | Total per year | 112,595 |  |

Figure 33 Estimated Uniqueness of \{ZIP, Gender, Month and year of birth\} in SID

| State | Population | Hospitalized | Unique | PopID |
| :---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| AZ | $3,665,228$ | 305,436 | $0.02 \%$ | 61 |
| CA | $29,755,274$ | $2,479,606$ | $0.01 \%$ | 248 |
| CO | $3,293,771$ | 274,481 | $0.08 \%$ | 220 |
| FL | $12,686,788$ | $1,057,232$ | $0.00 \%$ | 42 |
| IA | $2,776,442$ | 231,370 | $0.11 \%$ | 255 |
| MA | $6,011,978$ | 500,998 | $0.01 \%$ | 50 |
| MD | $4,771,143$ | 397,595 | $0.03 \%$ | 119 |
| NJ | $7,730,188$ | 644,182 | $0.01 \%$ | 64 |
| NY | $17,990,026$ | $1,499,169$ | $0.03 \%$ | 450 |
| OR | $2,842,321$ | 236,860 | $0.07 \%$ | 166 |
| SC | $3,486,703$ | 290,559 | $0.01 \%$ | 29 |
| WA | $4,866,692$ | 405,558 | $0.03 \%$ | 122 |
| WI | $4,891,452$ | 407,621 | $0.02 \%$ | 82 |
|  |  | Total per year | $\mathbf{1 , 9 0 7}$ |  |

Figure 34 Estimated Uniqueness of $\{Z I P$, Gender, Year of birth\} in SID

As shown in Figure 3, SID includes the year of birth (by way of age[18]), gender, and the patient's 5-digit residential ZIP for some states. Figure 34 estimates that 1,907 patients per year are likely to be uniquely identified by \{ZIP, Gender, Year of birth $\}$ in SID. The 13 states known to report the year of the birth date of each patient to SID were introduced in Error! Reference source not found.. The populations for each of these states according to the 1990 Census data [19] were reported in Figure 8 and Figure 9. It is estimated that 1:12 people are hospitalized each year. These values are summarized in Figure 34.

There are many ways to misunderstand these values. These values are not to be considered an estimate of the uniqueness of $\mathrm{R}_{\text {rod }}$ or SID. There may exist other quasi-identifiers that may consist of more and different attributes that can link to other available data and thereby render the released health data even more identifiable. Such quasi-identifiers may use the hospital identifying number or discharge status or payment information. The estimates reported in this document are just approximations based on the demographic quasi identifiers stated. Therefore, these estimates should be viewed as a minimal estimate of the identifiability of these data. Clearly, these data are not anonymous.

### 6.2. Unique and unusual information found in data

A significant problem with producing anonymous data concerns unique and unusual information appearing within the data themselves. Instances of uniquely occurring characteristics found within the original data can be used by a reporter, private investigator and others to discredit the anonymity of the released data even when these instances are not unique in the general population. Unusual cases are often unusual in other sources of data as well making them easier to identify.

Importantly, close examination of the particulars of a database provides the best basis for determining uniquely identifying information and quasi-identifiers. In this document, I have examined outside information without examining the values of the released data themselves. The analysis is based on the fact that a combination of characteristics that makes one unique in a geographic population, for example, results in uniqueness in all other data that includes that geographic specification. An examination of the data however can reveal other kinds of unusual information that can be found in other sources of data making more patients easier to identify.

In an interview, for example, a janitor may recall an Asian patient whose last name was Chan and who worked as a stockbroker because the patient gave the janitor some good investing tips. Any single uniquely occurring value or group of values can be used to identify an individual. Remember that the unique characteristic may not be known beforehand. It could be based on diagnosis, treatment, birth year, visit date, or some other little detail or combination of details available to the memory of a patient or a doctor, or knowledge about the database from some other source.

As another example, consider the medical records of a pediatric hospital in which only one patient is older than 45 years of age. Suppose a de-identified version of the hospital's records is to be released for public-use that includes age and city of residence but not birth date or zip code. Many may believe the resulting data would be anonymous because there are thousands of people of age 45 living in that city. However, the rare occurrence of a 45 year-old pediatric patient at that facility can become a focal point for anyone seeking to discredit the anonymity of the data. Nurses, clerks and other hospital personnel will often remember unusual cases and in interviews may provide additional details that help identify the patient.

### 6.3. Future Work

Below are proposed projects of varying degrees of difficulties and skill requirements that extend this work.
L. Sweeney, Simple Demographics Often Identify People Uniquely. Carnegie Mellon University, Data Privacy Working Paper 3. Pittsburgh 2000.

In this document, I have demonstrated how combinations of characteristics can combine to narrow the number of possible people under consideration. However, knowing that there exist a one or a few people that share particular characteristics and explicitly identifying those people are not exactly the same. These combinations of characteristics must be linked to explicitly identified information to reveal the identities of the individuals. Further demonstrate the identifiability of these data by providing population registers to which the data could be linked to re-identify the noted individuals.

In an earlier document [20], privacy risk measures were computed on the data sets $\mathrm{R}_{\text {rod }}$ and SID based on the assumption that the entire populations within those data were identifiable. While that may be correct, use the findings reported in this document, which are based only on basic demographic attributes and do not include other attributes within those data that could be used for re-identification, and re-compute the measures of risk for those collections. Make an argument as to why these re-computed risk measurements should be considered "minimal" risk values.

## 7. References

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17 Supra note 6 and note 11 U.S. Census.
18 Supra section 4.4.1 Age versus Year of Birth
19 Supra note 6 and note 11 U.S. Census.
20 L. Sweeney. Towards all the data on all the people. Formal publication forthcoming. Earlier version available as Carnegie Mellon Data Privacy Center Working Paper 2.


[^0]:    * In Loving County, Texas, 6 of 107 people are likely to be uniquely identified by values of \{gender, 2yr age range, county\}. All of these 6 people are between the ages of 12 and 18 years.

