

Privacy and Utility in Gov 2.0

Latanya Sweeney

Professor Jim Waldo


Disclaimer

The views and opinions in this presentation represent my own and are not necessarily those of HHS, ONC or the Obama Administration.

These views are for the benefit of public discourse and public education, and are not necessarily an opinion regarding any position I may take on related issues decided by the HIT Policy Committee.

Gov 2.0

Mugshots Online



US Counties » Florida » Broward County, FL

Andre Mickinson



William Mendez-Campu



Raymond K Meyers



Reginald Merisma



Markinsey Metayer



Michael L Melton



Ivey Merchant



Hector Meneses-Vega



the smoking gun SINCE 1997

HOME • DOCUMENTS • BUSTER • BACKSTAGE • **MUG SHOTS** • TIME WASTER



Add a comment...

Comment



Chris Ringue

I've gotta thank Suntrust. I shoved the heist under my chapeau, and even though the dye-pack went off, I got the most beautiful crimson weave for it...I say THANK YOU.

Reply · Like · November 5 at 9:14pm



Leo Roland · ★ Top Commenter · Brookfield High School

OK

Reply · Like · 10 hours ago



Alaba Bolanle' Koyejo · C.E.O at Yor Hyness Couture · 192 subscribers

Kehinde Koyejo.. Sis I told you to let me finish yo hair before you decided to rob a bank.. Dayummmmmmm!

Reply · Like · October 27 at 7:24pm

Hurry, before these deals set sail!

AdChoices 
PRINCESS CRUISES
escape completely
Book now 
*Legal restrictions apply.

FAQ | Widgets | Search by: last name **GO** zip code **GO**

Meet 256 people who were booked in the last 24 hours in Pinellas, Hillsborough, Manatee and Pasco counties.





Sheriff Joe Arpaio

MARICOPA COUNTY

SHERIFF'S OFFICE

Protecting and Serving the Valley of the Sun
Since 1893

Search

Go



MUGSHOTS

Mugshot of the Day!



First Name:

Last Name:

Booking:

Search

Clear

Viewing: M.O.D. Leader Board

Votes: 16



CHARLES
GATLIFF
11/17/2012

Votes: 11



SONYA MICHELLE
PALOMO-GONZALEZ
11/18/2012

Votes: 8



ALISHA LA SHAWN
ROLFSON
11/17/2012

Votes: 6



ANGEL PADILLA
11/18/2012

Votes: 4



DEANNA J
WINGARD
11/17/2012

Votes: 3



JASON GRANT
GETSCHER
11/17/2012

Votes: 3



CRYSTAL JEAN
POTTS
11/18/2012

Mugshots reflect bookings within the last 3 days. Individuals booked prior to that time will not be displayed.

PRE-TRIAL INMATES ARE INNOCENT UNTIL PROVEN GUILTY!

Public Records

Legislative Intent

Conflicting Laws



Sheriff Joe Arpaio

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the smoking gun SINCE 1997

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Michael L Melton



Ivey Merchant



Hector Meneses-Vega



Not Free Speech

Extortion

Technology as Policy Maker

Technology Design

Law

Market forces

Social norms

Code for architecture

Law

Technology Design

Market forces

Technology Design

Technology Design

Social norms

Social Security Numbers

123-45-6789

What does it tell you?

123-45-6789

State of Issuance

001-003 New Hampshire	232-236 West Virginia
004-007 Maine	232 North Carolina
008-009 Vermont	237-246
010-034 Massachusetts	681-690
035-039 Rhode Island	247-251 South Carolina
040-049 Connecticut	654-658
050-134 New York	252-260 Georgia
135-158 New Jersey	667-675
159-211 Pennsylvania	261-267 Florida
212-220 Maryland	589-595
221-222 Delaware	766-772
223-231 Virginia	268-302 Ohio

Source: Social Security Administration, <http://www.ssa.gov/foia/stateweb.html>

123-45-6789

State of Issuance

303-317 Indiana

318-361 Illinois

362-386 Michigan

387-399 Wisconsin

400-407 Kentucky

408-415 Tennessee

756-763*

416-424 Alabama

425-428 Mississippi

587-588

752-755*

429-432 Arkansas

433-439 Louisiana

659-665

440-448 Oklahoma

449-467 Texas

627-645

468-477 Minnesota

478-485 Iowa

486-500 Missouri

501-502 North Dakota

503-504 South Dakota

505-508 Nebraska

509-515 Kansas

123-45-6789

State of Issuance

516-517 Montana

518-519 Idaho

520 Wyoming

521-524 Colorado

650-653

525,585 New Mexico

648-649

526-527 Arizona

600-601

764-765

528-529 Utah

646-647

530 Nevada

680

531-539 Washington

540-544 Oregon

545-573 California

602-626

574 Alaska

575-576 Hawaii

750-751*

577-579 District of
Columbia

580 Virgin Islands

123-45-6789

State of Issuance

580-584 Puerto Rico

596-599

586 Guam

586 American Samoa

586 Philippine Islands

676-679

691-699*

700-728 Railroad Board**

* Some states may share the same area by transfer or split.

** Railroad employees, discontinued July 1, 1963.

000 will NEVER start a valid SSN.

123-45-6789

Order of Issuance

“Group numbers” assigned in this order:

ODD - 01, 03, 05, 07, 09

EVEN - 10 to 98

After 98:

EVEN - 02, 04, 06, 08

ODD - 11 to 99

123-45-6789

Order of Issuance

The Social Security Administration (SSA) publishes the highest group number assigned per area.

001	98	002	98	003	96	004
007	02	008	86	009	86	010
013	86	014	86	015	86	016
019	86	020	86	021	86	022
025	86	026	86	027	86	028
031	84	032	84	033	84	034
037	68	038	68	039	68	040

123-45-6789

Order of Issuance

The Social Security Administration (SSA) publishes the highest group number assigned per area.

001	98	002	98	003	96	004
007	02	008	86	009	80	010
013	86					
019	86					
025	86					
031	84					
037	68					

For area 003 (the first 3 digits of an SSN), the highest number used in the 4th and 5th digits is 96.

123-45-6789

Order of Issuance

ODD: 01, 03, 05, 07, 09 then EVEN: 10 to 98

After 98:

EVEN - 02, 04, 06, 08 then ODD 11 to 99

001	98	002	98	003	96	004
007	02	008	86	009	80	010
013	86	003-09-1234 valid SSN? 003-02-1234 valid SSN?				
019	86					
025	86	026	80	027	80	028
031	84	032	84	033	84	034
037	68	038	68	039	68	040

123-45-6789

Sequential

123-45-6789

What does it tell you?



SSNwatch

On-line SSN validation system. Given the first 3 or 5 digits of an SSN, returns the state in which the SSN was issued along with an estimated age range of the person.

Sample uses:

Job Applications

Apartment Rentals

Insurance Claims

Student Applications



SSNwatch

078-05-

Geography

New York

Date of issuance

Issued before 1993

Year of Birth

64% born 1889 to 1910

(5 -digit prefix)

98% born 1879 to 1921

If the person presenting the SSN is about age 20, then it is extremely unlikely that the provided SSN was issued to that person.



SSNwatch

078-05-

Geography

New York

Date of issuance

Issued before 1993

Year of Birth

64% born 1889 to 1910

(5 -digit prefix)

98% born 1879 to 1921


If the person presenting the SSN fails to list or acknowledge New York as a prior residence, then it is extremely unlikely that the provided SSN was issued to that person.

Predicting 6 to 9 digits of a young persons SSN.

Acquisti, A. and Gross, R. Predicting Social Security numbers from public data. Proceedings of the National Academy of Science. Jan 2009. <http://www.pnas.org/content/106/27/10975.abstract>

078-05-

{birthplace, dob} → SSN



When issued?

041-86-8892

Social Security Death Index


BRENDEN P LARSON

Birth date: **Dec 5, 1984** Death date: **Aug 3, 2007** SSN: 041-86-3208 State Issued: CT Residence location: [Unknown], [Unknown], [Unknown] Residence county:
Payment location: [Unknown], [Unknown], [Unknown] Payment county:

STEPHEN J COVEY

Birth date: **May 18, 1986** Death date: **Sep 29, 2007** SSN: 041-86-4765 State Issued: CT Residence location: East Hartford, Connecticut, 06118
Residence county: Hartford Payment location: [Unknown], [Unknown], [Unknown] Payment county:


http://www.americanancestors.org/search.aspx?Ca=0344&Da=269&Co=191&Re=04186*&Run=1



041-86-

Issued between 11/89 and 8/92

Area	Group	Serial	DOB	DOD
41	86	9936	9-Dec-79	19-May-06
41	86	9899	27-Jun-28	15-Aug-92
41	86	9453	1-Oct-73	21-Feb-93
41	86	9434	3-Dec-89	12-Jan-07
41	86	9378	27-Jul-36	6-Feb-09
41	86	9368	4-Dec-51	18-Feb-10
41	86	9349	16-Dec-13	14-Oct-00
41	86	9342	18-Aug-87	4-Jun-06
41	86	9204	12-Sep-86	19-Aug-02
41	86	9128	27-Nov-47	8-Oct-08
41	86	9000	12-Dec-20	21-Oct-96
41	86	8975	18-Sep-89	2-Apr-01
41	86	8907	23-Jul-32	9-Sep-10
41	86	8899	1-May-07	11-May-98
41	86	8892	???	???
41	86	8770	6-Aug-84	18-May-07
41	86	8289	27-Mar-87	20-Feb-09
41	86	8286	10-Oct-89	4-Mar-07
41	86	8274	9-Jan-78	6-Feb-00
41	86	8210	28-Sep-89	21-Aug-09
41	86	7939	26-Aug-63	23-Aug-06
41	86	7913	15-Jun-84	2-Dec-99
41	86	7725	11-Oct-70	21-Apr-05
41	86	7715	17-Feb-33	9-Jun-07
41	86	7701	31-Jul-81	21-Jan-10
41	86	7543	9-Jan-85	21-Oct-94
41	86	7407	23-Nov-87	11-Jul-07
41	86	7090	30-Nov-89	13-Jun-09
41	86	7015	23-Aug-23	4-Sep-99
41	86	6822	19-Jan-38	24-Apr-08



123-45-6789

What is a better way to
assign SSNs?

123-45-6789

How can you get someone's?



<http://socialsecuritypeoplesearch.com/index.asp>

Social Security People Search - Microsoft Internet Explorer

File Edit View Favorites Tools Help

Back Forward Stop Refresh Home Search Favorites Media Print Mail News RSS

Address <https://www.socialsecuritypeoplesearch.com/search.asp> Go Links Norton AntiVirus

* This search is for the following "lawful and permissible purpose":

Select one...

Name of the person you are looking for:

- Locate Former Patients (Medical Industry Only)
- Locating Beneficiaries and Heirs
- Locating Existing Customers
- Locating Former Customers
- Locating Former Employees
- Locating Fraud Victims**
- Locating Pension Fund Beneficiaries
- Necessary to Complete Transaction
- Permission from Subject
- Product Recalls

Done Internet

123-45-6789

What evil can others do?

Identity Theft

Federal Trade Commission Report: Victim Complaint Data

IDENTITY THEFT
Data Clearinghouse



Figure 1
How Victims' Information Is Misused¹
January 1 – December 31, 2001




¹Approximately 20% of the 86,168 victim complaints received from all sources (FTC Hotline and Internet complaint form, SSA -OIG Fraud Hotline referrals, and a small number from other law enforcement organizations) reported experiencing more than one type of identity theft.

Federal Trade Commission Report: Victim Complaint Data



Figure 3
Victim Age Distribution¹
January 1 – December 31, 2001



¹This chart is based on reports from victims who contacted the FTC directly (70,540 victims) because external data contributors generally do not provide this information. 88% (61,956) of all victims reporting directly to the FTC provided their age.

Discover Card: Enter Primary Information - Microsoft Internet Explorer

File Edit View Favorites Tools Help

Back Forward Stop Refresh Home Search Favorites Media

Address <https://www.novusnet.com/acqs/stdapp/r> Go Links Norton AntiVirus

DISCOVER FINANCIAL SERVICES **Discover® Student Card Application**

Apply for a Card

PROGRESS INDICATOR

Enter Primary Information Enter College Information Read and Agree to Important Information Verify and Submit

To apply, you must be at least 18 years of age and a U.S. citizen or U.S. resident.
[View Important Information about APR, fees and restrictions.](#)

Enter Primary Information

Personal Information
All fields marked * are required.

First Name *

Middle Name

Last Name *

Suffix

Date of Birth * / / 19
(Month) (Day)

Social Security Number * - -

Mother's Maiden Name *
(Last name only)

E-Mail Address

Done Internet

Credit Card Application

- Name
- Social Security number
- Address
- Date of birth
- Mother's maiden name

California on-line Birth Records

VitalSearch-California(USA):California State Births - Microsoft Internet Explorer

File Edit View Favorites Tools Help

Back Forward Stop Refresh Home Search Favorites Media

Address http://www.vitalsearch-ca.com/gen/_nonmembers/ca/_vitals/cabirt Go Links Norton AntiVirus

Showing records 0 - 30 (24608727 total, 98860 in query)

SQL-query:
SELECT Last_Name,First_Name,Middle_Name,B_yr,B_mo,B_dy,Mothers_Last_Name,Sex,County_of_Birth,idno
from cabirths_ygenfull where 1 and Last_Name like "Jones" LIMIT 0, 30

Last_Name	First_Name	Middle_Name	B_yr	B_mo	B_dy	Mothers_Last_Name	Sex	County_of_Birth
JONES			1905	09	11		MALE	RIVERSIDE
JONES			1905	06	14	KELLY	MALE	SAN FRANCISCO
JONES	ADA	T	1905	12	30	KARMODE	FEMALE	SOLANO
JONES	ALBERT		1905	09	02	SHADEY	MALE	SAN FRANCISCO
JONES	ASA		1905	08	07	TAITE	MALE	LOS ANGELES
JONES	BEATRICE	F	1905	11	05	FANNIN	FEMALE	SHASTA

[To California Birth Menu Page](#) [Help](#) [Begin](#)

Source: http://www.vitalsearch-ca.com/gen/_nonmembers/ca/_vitals/cabirths-nopsm.htm

Results of search on 'Jones'



AnyBirthday.com - Find Birthdays! - Microsoft Internet Explorer

File Edit View Favorites Tools Help

Back Forward Stop Refresh Home Search Favorites Media

Address http://dbserver.anybirthday.com/amehcs/WE Go Links Norton AntiVirus



AnyBirthday.com

Smith, John F.
846 West St., New York, NY 10001
Born: Sep. 11, 1902

Search using Age or birth



Locateme.com

[Click here for a Name and Age Se](#)

[Click here for Addresses and Phone Numbers of your search subject](#)

anybirthday.com given a name, provides a birthday

Subject's Name	Birthdate	Zip Code
SCOT - LYTLE	03-JUN-54	17257
ADDRESS: * Included for <i>Plus</i> Users Only Click for Anybirthday PLUS		

SCOT P LYTLE	26-SEP-74	20772
ADDRESS: * Included for <i>Plus</i> Users Only Click for Anybirthday PLUS		

Internet

Identity Angel –resumes

1. Locate on-line resumes
(using Filtered Searching)
2. Extract sensitive values
(using regular expressions)
3. Email subjects about their risks



123-45-6789

Can we solve the
problem by just having
everyone publish their
SSN on the Web?

Surveillance of the Homeless

“...perform an unduplicated accounting of homeless persons sufficient to provide annual reports ... documenting the demographics and utilization patterns of homeless persons.”

Conference Report (H.R. Report 107-272) for the Fiscal Year 2002 HUD Appropriations Act (Public Law 107-73).

Congress:
track homeless → save money.

From \$10 to \$115mil in 10 years

New York City spent \$1 bil

New York City Independent Budget Office. Give 'Em Shelter: Various City Agencies Spend Over \$900 Million on Homeless Services. Fiscal Brief, March 2002


County Funding Soon Exhausted

Northeast Ohio Coalition for the Homeless. Overflowing Shelters: a history and recommended solutions.
April 9, 2005. www.neoch.org/what_to_do_overflowing.htm


Unmet shelter requests:
37% overall, 52% family

Why? Dunno.

HUD: Homeless Management Information Systems (HMIS)



HMIS Data Flow



Universal Data Elements

Unique Identifier (“UID”)

~~Name~~

~~Social Security Number~~

Date of Birth

Ethnicity and Race

Gender

Veteran Status

Disabling Condition

Residence Prior to
Program Entry

Code of Last Permanent
Address

Program Entry Date

Program Exit Date

Unique Person
Identification Number

Program Identification
Number

Household Identification
Number

Program-Specific Data Elements

Income Sources

Non-cash Benefits

Physical Disability

Developmental Disability

HIV/AIDS

Mental Health

Substance Abuse

Domestic Violence

Services Received

Destination Type

Reasons for Leaving

Employment

Education

General Health Status

Pregnancy Status

Veterans Information

Children's Education

HUD Reporting (Sample)

Question # AHAR Questions: Emergency Shelter -Individuals

- 1 How many people used emergency shelters at __ time?
 - 2 What is the distribution of family sizes using emergency shelters?
 - 3 What are the demographics of individuals using emergency shelters?
 - 3 distribution by gender?
 - 3 distribution by race and ethnicity?
 - 3 distribution by age group?
 - 3 distribution by household size?
 - 3 distribution by veteran status? By disabling condition?
 - 4 What was the living arrangement the night before entering the emergency shelter?
 - 4 within/outside geographical jurisdiction?
 - 5 What is distribution of the number of nights in an emergency shelter?
 - 5 distribution by gender?
 - 5 distribution by age group?
-

Common Techniques for Constructing Made-up Identifiers

Encoding

“09121960F37213”

Date Sex ZIP
of birth


Hashing

“8126r1329ws”

“986s594652”


Date Sex ZIP
of birth

Problems with Consistent Hashing



Problems with Consistent Hashing

bits	seconds
28	1
29	3
30	7
31	15
32	31
33	62
34	124
35	249
36	499
37	998
38	1996
39	3993
40	7986
41	15963
42	31926
43	63888
44	127725
45	255463
46	510774
47	1021463



Encryption

“8126r1329ws”


“8126r1329ws” + key

= “9/12/1960, F, 37213”

Date
of birth

Sex ZIP

Scan Cards / RFID Tags



Biometrics



“23968c235z9”

fingerprint

Consent

“Jane Smith, 9/12/1960, F, 37213”

UID TECHNOLOGY	UTILITY					PRIVACY					
	Non-verifiable source	Verifiable source	Client Trust	Inflate Accounting	Deflate Accounting	Bad or missing info	Intimate stalker	Linking	Dictionary attack	Reverse engineer	Expose new issues
Encoding	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Hashing	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Encryption	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Scan Cards/RFID	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Biometrics	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Consent	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Inconsistent Hash	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Distributed Query	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■

■	Most severe/difficult problem
■	Moderate problem
■	A problem
■	May be a problem
■	No problem likely, or not applicable

Threats?

Intimate Stalker “Threat”

- Knows detailed information about a targeted client
- Is highly motivated to locate a targeted client
- Can compromise a shelter or Planning Office

Planning Office “Threat”

- Has lots of other information that may contain the client.
- Motivated to learn information about clients by combining available client-specific data
- Can combine data to construct client profiles

Privacy Standard?

De-Identification Under HIPAA Scientific Standard

Based on generally accepted statistical and scientific principles and methods, a person certifies that

“the risk is very small that the information could be used, alone or in combination with other reasonably available information, by an anticipated recipient to identify an individual who is a subject of the information.”

Minimal risk.

VAWA Privacy Standard

[not share] identifying information ... about an individual ...likely to disclose the location, including

-
- (I) first and last name;
- (II) home or physical address;
- (III) contact information, including e-mail address, or telephone number or IP address;
- (IV) a social media profile; and
- (V) any other information, including date of birth, racial or ethnic identity, ... that, in combination with any other personally identifying information would serve to identify any individual.

**Provable
anonymity.**

Solution

Secure Multi-Party Computation

1. Diffie and Hellman. New directions in cryptography. *IEEE Transactions on Information Theory*, 22(6):644-654, 1976.
2. Adi Shamir. How to share a secret. *Communications of the ACM*, 22(11):612-613, 1979
3. D. Chaum. Blind signatures for untraceable payments. In *Proceedings of Advances in Cryptology*, pages 199-203. Plenum Press, 1982
4. A. Yao. Protocols for secure computations. In *Proceedings, IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science*, pages 160-164. IEEE Computer Society, 1982.



Carnegie Mellon

DATA PRIVACY LAB

Secure Multi-Party Computation

DNA databases

- Malin's PhD Thesis '06
(Malin and Sweeney '01, '05)

General


- RandomOrder Protocol
(Sweeney and Shamos '04)

Bioterrorism Surveillance

- PrivaSum Protocol
(Edo-Eket and Sweeney '04)

PrivaMix (This Work)

multiple sources produce
an anonymous linked dataset





Carnegie Mellon

DATA PRIVACY LAB

The Big Idea in 3 Steps

1. Compute “dedentifiers.”


2. Send data and dedentifiers
to Planning Office.

3. Use network to “mix” dedentifiers.

Step 1. Compute Dedentifiers

For each C_i visiting Shelter S_j ,

S_j computes $F(\text{SSN}_i, s_j) = D_{ij}$



Step 2. Data to Planning Office

P creates a table $\{S_j, D_{ij}, UDE_{ij}\}$
for Client C_i at Shelter S_j .

Planning
Office

Shelter	Dedentifier	UDE
S_1	ax4	...
S_1	1804	...
S_2	b3s7	...
S_2	ghre	...

Step 3. Mixing Dedentifiers

3.1 Randomly select Shelter order & send D' s to S_1 .

For $k = 2$ to n do:

3.2. P computes:

$$\mathbf{Z}_1 = \left\{ x \mid x = F^a \left(F(SSN_i, s_j), \dots \right), x \in \mathbf{Z}, a \geq 0, j \neq k \right\}$$

$$\mathbf{Z}_2 = \left\{ x \mid x = F^a \left(F(SSN_i, s_j), \dots \right), x \in \mathbf{Z}, a \geq 0, j = k \right\}$$


3.3. P sends \mathbf{Z}_1 to S_k

3.4. S_k sends P:

$$\mathbf{Z}_{Sk} = \left\{ F(x, s_k) \mid x = F^a \left(F(SSN_i, s_j), \dots \right), \forall x \in \mathbf{Z}_1 \right\}$$

3.5. P computes: $\mathbf{Z} = \mathbf{Z}_{Sk} \cup \mathbf{Z}_2$

Mixing Rounds



Mixing Results

$$H2732 = F(F(SSN_1, s_2), s_1)$$


$$0yfh02 = F(F(SSN_3, s_2), s_1)$$

$$H2732 = F(F(SSN_1, s_1), s_2)$$

$$nw450 = F(F(SSN_2, s_2), s_2)$$

The Client whose SSN was the same has the same final mix, notwithstanding the order of mixing.

Planning Office Learns



Planning Office

Completely Mixed Dedentifiers	Shelter1	Shelter2
H2732	ax4	b3s7
nw450	1804	
0yfh02		ghre

Simplified Multiplication Example

Mult(³, 13) = 39

Mult(⁷, 13) = 91



39 69
91 253

Mult(69, 13) = 897
Mult(253, 13) = 3289



69 39
253 91

Mult(39, 23) = 897
Mult(91, 23) = 2093

Mult(³, 23) = 69

Mult(¹¹, 23) = 253

Shelter1	Shelter2
39	897
91	2093
897	69
3289	253

Planning Office Learns



Completely Mixed Dedentifiers	Shelter1	Shelter2
897	39	69
2093	91	
3289		253

Simplified Multiplication Example

Mult(³, 13) = 39



~~$(3 * 13) * 23$~~ * 13

$(3 * 13) * 23 = 897$
 $(3 * 23) * 13 = 897$




~~$(3 * 23) * 23$~~

Mult(³, 23) = 69

Shelter1	Shelter2
39	897
897	69

Planning Office Learns



Planning Office

Completely Mixed Dedentifiers	Shelter1	Shelter2
897	39	69
2093	91	
3289		253

PrivaMix Function Requirements

1. Inconsistent assignment
2. One-way (hard to reverse)
3. Commutative (enable reordering)
4. Privacy: secret client info not complete or partial information
5. Collision-free
6. Correct: same final values iff same client

$$z_i^1 = (c_i^{s1} \bmod p)$$

$$z_i^{12} = (c_i^{s1} \bmod p)^{s2} \bmod p$$

$$z_i^{21} = (c_i^{s2} \bmod p)^{s1} \bmod p$$

How good is it?

Utility

If a client's private value is unique and consistently used, then her utilization pattern will be accurate.*

Privacy

Compromising a shelter will not help the intimate stalker learn where a targeted client has been.*

UID TECHNOLOGY	UTILITY						PRIVACY				
	Non-verifiable source	Verifiable source	Client Trust	Inflate Accounting	Deflate Accounting	Bad or missing info	Intimate stalker	Linking	Dictionary attack	Reverse engineer	Expose new issues
Encoding	Black	Grey	Grey	Grey	Black	Black	Black	Black	Black	Black	Grey
Hashing	Black	White	Grey	Grey	Black	Black	Black	Black	Black	Grey	White
Encryption	Black	White	Grey	Grey	Black	Black	Black	Black	Black	Grey	Grey
Scan Cards/RFID	Grey	Grey	Black	Black	Grey	Grey	Grey	Grey	Grey	Grey	Black
Biometrics	White	White	Grey	Grey	Grey	Grey	Grey	Grey	Grey	Grey	Black
Consent	Black	White	Grey	Grey	Grey	Grey	Black	Black	Black	Black	Black
Inconsistent Hash	Black	White	Grey	Black	Grey	Black	Grey	White	Grey	Grey	White
Distributed Query	Black	White	White	Black	Grey	Black	Grey	White	White	White	White
PrivaMix (client-level)	Black	White	White	Black	Grey	Black	Grey	Grey	White	White	White
PrivaMix (aggregate)	Black	White	White	Black	Grey	Black	White	White	White	White	White

[Index](#)

Real-world Iowa Experiment

Conducted by Abt Associates in Des Moines

PrivaMix source: {first name, date of birth}

6 months of data

UID Method	Unduplicated Count (A)	False Negatives (B)	False Positives (C)	Error Percentage
SSN	1360	59	269	15.4
Servicepoint	1646	76	0	3.6
Servicepoint 2	1619	51	2	2.5
Proposed Privacert	1614	44	0	2.1

[Index](#)

What did we learn?

- Avoid ad hoc approaches
- Brainstorm about threats
- Understand governing privacy standard
- Solve for privacy “and” utility

